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18. TAX EXPENDITURES RELATED TO THE PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION OF TRANSPORTATION FUELS 
 
 
 
18.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
18.1.1 Background 
 It is an elementary principle of economics that if a good or service is underpriced 
— that is, if the all-inclusive economic cost to society of consuming the good or service 
exceeds the private-cost price that consumers actually pay for it— then consumers will 
consume “too much” of it from the standpoint of society. More precisely, unless the 
underpriced good is offered by a monopoly, or provides unaccounted for (external) 
benefits, the amount consumed will exceed the amount that provides the greatest net 
benefits to society. Generally, the correct solution to this problem is to set all prices in 
the economy equal to marginal social cost rather than marginal private cost.  
 For most if not all goods and services, the marginal social cost exceeds the 
marginal private cost, if only because nearly all production and consumption creates 
pollution. Recently, however, many researchers have argued that this divergence 
between social cost and private cost is especially serious in the case of motor vehicles 
and transportation fuels. These researchers often label this divergence the “unpaid” cost 
of motor-vehicle use, and usually estimate three different kinds of unpaid costs: 
environmental externalities (e.g., the harmful effects of air pollution or oil spills), 
public-sector expenditures in excess of user fees received (e.g., expenditures on 
highways less road-user tax revenues), and so-called “tax subsidies” (preferential 
treatment in the tax code), which we will refer to as “tax expenditures1.” (See Report #3 
in this series for a review of estimates of the social-cost of motor-vehicle use.)  
 In this report, we too provide estimates of tax expenditures related to the 
production and consumption of transportation fuels. But—and this is an important 
qualification—we do not add the estimates of environmental externalities, public-sector 
expenditures, and tax expenditures together because, as we will explain in more detail 
later, tax expenditures are not necessarily social costs in the same way that environmental 
externalities and public-sector expenditures for roads are.  In other words, tax expenditures 
or subsidies do not belong in an analysis of the social-cost of motor vehicle use, because 
they are not necessarily an economic cost, or welfare loss, to society.  Of course, tax 
expenditures are relevant in analyses of the “fairness” or “neutrality” of transportation, 
energy, and tax policy, and for this reason we have estimated them here2. But the main 
point must be kept in mind throughout this analysis: in the absence of social-welfare 
analytical demonstration to the contrary, one should not count tax expenditures as an 
item in the social cost.  
 
                                                
1Note the subtle distinction between a tax expenditure and a tax subsidy: the expenditure is what the 
government foregoes, and the subsidy is what a producer gains, as a result of special tax provisions. 
 
2 We do apply our estimates of tax expenditures from this report in our equity-based analysis of user  
payments for government-provided motor-vehicle infrastructure and services in report #17 in the UCD 
social-cost series. 
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18.1.2 Outline of this paper 
 First we will present the theory, and explain why tax expenditures are not 
necessarily a social economic cost—that is, why they do not necessarily constitute a 
reduction in social welfare.  Next we will review the literature, which builds up 
estimates of tax expenditures piecemeal, tax provision by tax provision.  Then, we will 
offer an alternative way to estimate tax expenditures, based on aggregate corporate 
income-tax rates.  We do this for 1991 and for the year 2000, the most recent year for 
which data are available. We also provide an estimate of tax expenditures related to 
transportation based on differences in sales tax rates.  
 
 
18.2  THEORETICAL ISSUES 
 
18.2.1 Definition of a tax expenditure 
 The tax code does not treat every individual and every business the same way.  
For example, certain products are exempt from sales tax, and some mineral production 
activities are allowed special deductions that reduce income tax liabilities.  As a result of 
this differential tax treatment, some people and businesses pay less (or more) tax, both 
in total and per unit of income, than do others. If one defines a “baseline” or “standard” 
tax rate on particular entities, one can then calculate the difference between the taxes 
actually paid by the entity and the taxes that would have been paid had the entity been 
taxed at the “standard” or baseline rate. This difference has been called a tax 
expenditure:  
Tax expenditures exist when actual tax treatment for particular kinds of taxpayers 
deviates from standard tax treatment” (EIA, 1992, p. 21).  
 The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) of the U.S. Congress elaborates:  
“Tax expenditures” are defined under the Budget Act...as reductions in individual and 
corporate income tax liabilities that result from special tax provisions or regulations that 
provide tax benefits to particular taxpayers.  These special tax provisions can take the 
form of exclusions, credits, deductions, preferential tax rates, or deferrals of tax 
liability...In general, a special provision is classified as a tax expenditure because the 
provision represents a departure from the taxation of economic income that is made for 
reasons other than administrative feasibility (JCT, 1993, page 2)3.  
According to the JCT, the tax expenditure is calculated by estimating the 
“difference between tax liability under current law and the tax liability that would 
result from a recomputation of tax without benefit of the tax expenditure provision.  
Taxpayer behavior is assumed to remain unchanged for tax expenditure purposes” 
(JCT, 1993, page 8).  
Tax expenditures, then, depend entirely on what one deems to be the “standard” 
treatment, with respect to which deviations constitute “preferential” treatment. What is 
“standard” ultimately is a matter of taste, and as a result, “there is disagreement as to 
what constitutes standard tax treatment...” (EIA, 1992, p. 21).   
                                                
3 Note that the tax expenditures identified by JCT and the Treasury (OMB) refer only to preferential 
treatment in federal income tax provisions.  They do not consider other forms of taxation such as federal 
excise taxes, or state and local income taxes. 
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18.2.2 Tax expenditures and social welfare.  
 Over the past 15 years there have been several estimates of tax expenditures 
related to oil use (see the literature review below, and also Koplow and Dernback [2001] 
and Koplow [2004]). In most of these studies the expenditures are referred to as a 
“subsidy,” which in some studies seems to imply that the expenditure is, or constitutes, 
a social cost, in the same way that the cost of the highways or the cost of air pollution is 
a social cost (i.e., a reduction in social welfare, the benefits of use aside).  In any event, 
still other researchers have interpreted tax expenditures to be social costs (in economic 
terms), and have incorporated the original estimates of expenditures (from the studies 
reviewed below) into analyses of the total social cost of oil use or motor-vehicle use.  As 
we stated in the introduction, we believe that this is an error. In the following section 
we will explain why.  
 The tax expenditure estimates in the major original analyses that we will review, 
such as the studies by the EIA (1992) and Koplow (1993), are derived from data 
published by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Office of Management and 
Budget. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) requires that the 
U.S. Federal budget, published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
include estimates of tax expenditures.  In compliance with the law, every Federal 
budget contains estimates of tax expenditures for three years: the last fiscal year, the 
current fiscal year, and the coming fiscal year for which the budget was submitted.   
The OMB develops its estimates of tax expenditures in cooperation with the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), which publishes its own estimates of 
tax expenditures. The OMB and JCT both derive their figures from Internal Revenue 
Service statistics, for the purpose of projecting the tax credits, deductions, and 
exclusions that will be claimed under the present-law baseline (JCT, 1993, page 8)4.   
 Now, as noted just above, some social-cost analyses add up the OMB or JCT 
estimates of tax expenditures and represent the total as a social cost of oil use or motor-
vehicle use. However, there are methodological problems with this simple addition, 
and more serious theoretical problems with interpreting the total as a social cost. In the 
first place, a simple summation does not account properly for the interaction of joint 
changes in different tax provisions. Second, the JCT and OMB estimates are short-run 
and static, and do not account for changes in the behavior of firms or individuals or the 
macro-economy as a result of eliminating a tax expenditure. For these reasons, the 
simple sum of the OMB and JCT estimates does not represent the difference in tax 
revenue between the status-quo baseline and a scenario with no preferential taxes. But     
even if the simple sum was an accurate measure of aggregate tax expenditures, it still 
would not be a social cost of oil use or motor-vehicle use in the way that expenditures 
on the highway patrol or the environmental effects of oil spills are.  This is because, 
even though tax expenditures distort prices and economic behavior, in any economy with 
                                                
4Although the JCT and the OMB have similar objectives, their estimates of tax expenditures do differ.  
First, the agencies report expenditures for different time periods.  The OMB estimates “cover the usual 
three-year period of a budget submission - the last fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the forthcoming 
fiscal year to which the budget proposals apply.  The Joint Committee staff estimates cover the 
forthcoming fiscal year and the succeeding four fiscal years” (JCT, 1993, page 6).  Second, they define 
taxable income differently, and treat foreign income differently. In addition, the JCT considers a 
somewhat broader set of tax expenditures than does the OMB.   
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multiple distortions, we are not necessarily better off if we eliminate any particular tax 
expenditures.  We discuss all of these problems in more detail next. 
  
18.2.2.1  Tax expenditure estimates should not simply be summed  
 The first problem is that simply summing the OMB and JCT estimates does not 
account for interaction effects. The Joint Committee on Taxation clearly states that “each 
tax expenditure is measured in isolation.  If two or more items were to be eliminated 
simultaneously, the result of the combination of changes might produce a lesser or 
greater revenue than the sum of the amounts shown for each item separately.” Because 
of this, they caution that summing the amounts of the various tax expenditures is of 
“limited usefulness” (JCT, 1989, page 8).  
 The OMB provides an excellent example of the problems with ignoring the 
interaction effects for personal income taxes: 
If the state and local interest exclusion alone were repealed, some taxpayers would be 
thrust into higher tax brackets, automatically increasing the size of their charitable 
contribution tax expenditure even if taxpayers did not make larger charitable 
contributions.  Alternatively, if both the interest exclusion and the charitable deduction 
were repealed simultaneously, the increase in tax liability would be greater than the sum 
of the two separate expenditures since each is estimated assuming that the other is in 
force (OMB, 1992, page 2-24). 
 In this case, if both tax provisions were rescinded, aggregating the individual 
estimates as published would understate the true change in tax expenditures. 
 
18.2.2.2  Tax expenditure estimates do not account for the  microeconomic or macroeconomic 
effects of eliminating the expenditure 
 The OMB and JCT figures also do not incorporate any adjustments that firms 
might make in response to changes in the tax code.  Their published estimates of the tax 
expenditures, or revenue losses, measure the amount of additional revenue the 
government would receive if the Federal government were to repeal unexpectedly a 
particular tax provision on the day that the corporations filed their tax returns (so that 
the firms could make no behavioral adjustments in response to the policy change). 
Because this unrealistic “snapshot” analysis does not allow for any adjustments that 
firms will make in the longer run, it does not, as the OMB and JCT clearly state, provide 
a realistic estimate of the effect of eliminating a tax expenditure. 
 In reality, firms will change their decisions in response to new tax policies.  Let 
us use the investment tax credit as an example.  The estimates published by OMB and 
JCT assume that if the investment tax credit were eliminated, there would be no change 
in the investment decisions of the firms. But obviously this is not realistic. The credit is 
meant to encourage firms to invest; hence, if it were eliminated, firms would invest less, 
and their tax liability, and hence tax payments might be different than if the tax credit 
were in effect.    
 At the macro scale, tax expenditures that favor capital investment, such as 
accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit, could impact aggregate income 
and economic growth.  This is relevant to the estimate of the tax expenditures 
themselves because any changes in the projected growth rates for aggregate national 
income could alter the tax base against which tax expenditures are measured.  The OMB 
and JCT estimates of growth rates assume that all existing laws will continue.  If tax 
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expenditures are eliminated growth rates might be different than assumed by the OMB 
and JCT in their original estimates of the tax expenditures.  
 In sum, quoting from the OMB:  
Tax expenditure revenue loss estimates do not necessarily equal the increase in Federal 
revenues (or the reduction in budget deficits) that would accompany the repeal of the 
special provisions, for the following reasons: Eliminating a tax expenditure may have 
incentive effects that alter economic behavior...Tax expenditures are interdependent even 
without incentive effects...The annual value of tax expenditures for tax deferrals is 
prepared on a cash basis (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1992, 2-24). 
 
18.2.2.3  Tax expenditures are not necessarily an economic cost, let alone an economic cost equal 
to the expenditure 
 There is no doubt that the preferential tax treatments identified by the JCT and 
OMB affect economic behavior in some way. Furthermore, it is obvious that, were the 
preferential tax policies the only deviations from optimal conditions in the economy (in 
a second-best world in which the government still raised revenue by taxes, rather than 
by lump-sum transfers)—i.e., if they were the only reasons that social welfare was not at 
its potential (second-best) maximum — then eliminating them would be beneficial, 
because it would restore the second-best optimum. In this one-distortion second-best 
world, tax expenditures would occasion a real cost, equal to the difference between the 
maximum social welfare and the social welfare with the tax expenditures.  
 But note two points. First, in the one-distortion economy, the real cost of the tax 
expenditure is the difference between social welfare with and without the expenditure, 
which difference probably will be much less than the expenditure itself. An analogy can 
be drawn with the true cost of price subsidies, in which the welfare cost of the price 
subsidy is considerably less than the total subsidy itself. This is illustrated in Figure 18-
1, which is discussed later.  
 Second, but more important, we can be sure that the tax expenditure creates an 
economic cost only if it is the only imperfect policy in an otherwise perfect (but second-
best) world. Although it might sound perverse, it is quite possible that, given all of the 
distortions in the real economy, some tax expenditures actually could be beneficial: that 
eliminating them would make society worse off, not better. This anyway is the 
somewhat discouraging conclusion of the “general theory of the second-best,” 
originally developed and elaborated by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57) and Davis and 
Whinston (1965), and summarized here by Laffont (1990):5  
(a) If a distortion [e.g. tax expenditure] exists in one sector (this is, there is some 
constraint that prevents the first-best optimal conditions from being satisfied in this 
sector), it is no longer generally desirable to apply the first-best optimality condition in 
other sectors... 
(b) If n distortions (where n ≥ 2) exist, we cannot claim that the competitive equilibrium 
with n - 1 distortions is preferable to the competitive equilibrium with n distortions is 
preferable to the competitive equilibrium with n distortions... 
                                                
5The impacts of policy changes in a distorted economy have been well studied in the literature on trade 
policy -- e.g.,  Martin and Alston (1994) and Martin (1994).  
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(c) The problems of equity and efficiency can no longer be separated unless we use 
personalized lump-sum transfers as political economic instruments. 
(d) The results obtained in second-best analysis may contradict the economist’s intuition 
in the first-best analysis. (Laffont, 1990, page 167; brackets added). 
 Laffont’s conclusions apply to any analysis of tax expenditures in the real world, 
because  the real world is far from being economically ideal.  Rarely, if ever, are taxes 
based on economic principles of pricing, user charges, and cost allocation.  Instead, 
taxes are frequently set according to political, not economic, criteria, and as a result, 
every sector of the economy is distorted in manifold and difficult-to-quantify ways. 
Because of these distortions, one must perform a complex general equilibrium/social-
welfare analysis in order to determine the effect of tax expenditures on welfare. As 
mentioned above, there is no reason to believe that such an analysis will reveal that on 
balance, tax expenditures create economic costs.  
 Laffont’s second comment is the most relevant to our discussion.  We are 
indisputably in an economy which is characterized by n ≥ 2 distortions.  Hence, getting 
rid of tax expenditures on the oil industry would not necessarily improve social 
welfare, and could in principle diminish it6. This might be the case if everyone was 
being taxed too much on average; i.e., if the marginal social value of tax resources were 
higher in the private sector than the public sector. In this case, it might be better to have 
a few industries taxed less than average than have all industries taxed at the same too-
high rate.  
 In summary, then; 
  
 • In the real (economically far-from-perfect) world, any particular tax 
expenditure does not necessarily create a real cost to society.  
 • Even if a tax expenditure does create a cost, the cost will not necessarily be 
equal to the amount of the expenditure—it probably will be less. 
  
18.2.2.4  Tax expenditures are  a question of “fairness” 
 The preceding discussion tell us that we cannot add up estimates of tax 
expenditures and call the total a social cost. This does not mean, of course, that 
estimates of tax expenditures are completely useless. Even if they tell us nothing about 
welfare costs (unless we do a general-equilibrium/social-welfare analysis), they do 
convey information about how government treats different activities. In short, tax 
expenditures certainly are of interest in analyses of equity, if not necessarily analyses of 
efficiency. However, even in an equity analysis, one must recognize the “interaction” 
and “incentive” problems, discussed above, of aggregating the estimates from the JCT 
and OMB.  
 
                                                
6There is another questionhere: with respect to what is a tax expenditure a distortion? Answers to this 
question inevitably are judgmental. 
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18.2.3  Tax expenditures versus public-sector costs (agency outlays)  
 The preceding discussion on preferential tax treatment begets an obvious 
question: do the problems with estimating tax expenditure subsidies also apply to direct 
government outlays, such as for highway construction and maintenance?  We will 
argue that they do not, and that public-sector expenditures can be considered social 
costs. (Note that in this report, this question is of theoretical interest only, because we 
do not actually estimate agency outlays here.) 
 Certain government outlays related to the use of oil or motor vehicles (e.g., 
outlays for highways, the highway patrol, and pollution regulation) represent (at least 
crudely) a true resource or opportunity costs of oil use or motor-vehicle use, whereas as 
we have just seen tax expenditures associated with oil use generally do not. These 
government outlays are not merely transfers; they are the long-run public-sector 
resource costs of oil use or motor-vehicle use.  For example, if there were no motor 
vehicles, then the Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Mobile Sources probably 
would not exist.7  If there were no Office of Mobile Sources, then people employed 
there would do something else, and the capital used there would be put to other uses. 
These other activities and purposes would be the foregone real benefits —the opportunity 
cost—of devoting people and capital to the Office of Mobile Sources.  
  By contrast, as explained above, it is not at all clear that there would be real 
welfare benefits to eliminating tax expenditures. If the oil industry were taxed more, 
then either other industries would be taxed less, or the government would collect more 
revenue, or some combination of both. Whether or not it would be beneficial to tax the 
oil industry more and other industries less would depend on the marginal productivity 
of the industries and many other factors. Even if it was beneficial—and it might well not 
be—the magnitude of the net benefit almost certainly would be less than the magnitude 
of the tax expenditure, because the bulk of the effect simply would be to shift the tax 
burden. Similarly, whether or not it would be beneficial to tax the oil industry more and 
provide more government services would depend on the marginal cost to the industry 
of the tax and the marginal value of the extra government services. Again, even if it 
were beneficial—and it might well not be—the magnitude of the net benefit would 
almost certainly be less than the tax expenditure because the benefit (in government 
goods and services) provided by eliminating the expenditure would be reduced by the 
cost to the industry.  
 In addition, government outlays are probably are less intimately related to 
industry behavior than are tax expenditures, and probably can be added to obtain a 
total cost. It is reasonable to assume that, for example, the total public-sector resource 
savings from eliminating the EPA office of Mobile Sources and U.S. Department of 
Energy spending on research and development simultaneously is approximately the 
sum of the outlays for each of the programs.8  It is not necessarily the case that 
eliminating these will significantly affect either the behavior of industry, or 
expenditures on other government programs.  
  
                                                
7 This ignores the small amount of attention to non-highway mobile sources. 
 
8 Estimating the amount of these expenditures allocated to the oil industry is more complicated. 
 
 8 
18.2.4  Public-sector costs versus environmental externalities 
 Although public-sector costs and environmental externalities both are economic 
costs of oil use or motor-vehicle use, there is, of course, an important difference between 
them: the former typically are long-run costs of public-sector decisions, whereas the 
latter usually are short-run costs of private decisions. If tomorrow many people decide 
to drive fewer miles, then tomorrow there will be less air pollution from motor vehicles. 
But there will not be less roadway, or less police service. If the reduction in driving is 
significant and sustained, then in the long run the public sector might recognize that 
less roadway and less police service is needed, and adjust the supply accordingly. Thus, 
we may count [most] public-sector expenditures as a cost of motor-vehicle or 
transportation-fuel use only if we are doing an analysis of large changes in vehicle or 
fuel use in the long run.  By contrast, we may count [most] environmental externalities 
in any kind of analysis.  
 
18.2.5  A note on government price subsidy programs 
 Thus far we have talked about tax expenditures, which represent tax revenue 
foregone because of preferential tax treatment (and which as explained above are not 
necessarily social costs) and public-sector resource costs, such as the cost of building 
highways. Some researchers claim that a third class of government expenditures, price 
or quantity subsidy programs, also are true costs to society. An example of a subsidy 
program is the Low-Income Home Assistance Program (LIHEAP), which provides 
assistance to low-income homes with high energy bills. (See Appendix 18-A of this 
report for more details.)  
 For our purposes, however, subsidy programs are more like tax expenditures 
than like true direct resource costs. Price subsidies do affect welfare, but they do so by 
distorting prices and hence consumption, and so are similar in their effect to tax 
expenditures. It is relatively easy to show diagrammatically how a single price subsidy, 
viewed in isolation, reduces welfare and hence has a real cost to society. In Figure 18-1, a 
good is subsidized by the amount  P’-P, so that consumers pay P and demand Q. In the 
absence of the subsidy, consumers would pay P* and demand Q*.  As a result of the 
subsidy, consumers consume marginal units that cost more to produce than they are 
worth. This cost of excess consumption, due to the subsidized price, is the area of above 
the demand curve (the marginal value curve) and below the supply curve (the cost 
curve)—area xyz in Figure 18-1. If the subsidy were removed, these net costs would not 
be incurred. Thus, xyz is the welfare cost of the subsidy.  
 Now, note first that the welfare cost is much less than the total subsidy, which is 
the subsidy price P’-P multiplied by the subsidized quantity, Q, or area P’yxP. We 
postulated the same kind of effect in the case of tax expenditures. Furthermore, this 
analysis isolates the subsidy from the rest of the distorted economy. It is not impossible 
that, were the subsidy to be analyzed as part of the bigger economic picture, it would 
not have a cost at all—just like in the case of tax expenditures. 
 In the end, our distinction between tax expenditures and subsidy programs on 
the one hand, and some public-sector costs on the other, is mainly a distinction between 
moving resources around, which can be said to have an only  “indirect” effect on welfare 
via price changes, and actually consuming resources, in the form of manpower and 
materials, to provide goods and services. Tax expenditures move resources around 
(mainly). Highway building (for example) consumes resources.  
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18.3  TYPES OF TAX EXPENDITURES 
 
 In this section, we discuss some of the important tax expenditures which pertain 
to the oil industry.  We describe each kind of tax expenditure, and explain under what 
conditions it is reasonable to count the expenditure in an “equity” analysis of 
government support. We emphasize—again—that tax expenditures are relevant in a 
discussion of equity, but not, in the absence of a general-equilibrium/social-welfare 
analysis, in a discussion of economic efficiency. That is, we may set up some standard of 
fairness, and then measure tax expenditures with respect to that, but we may not 
classify tax expenditures as social costs, or sources of economic (welfare) losses, unless 
we have done the additional analysis to determine the effect of a tax expenditure on 
economic efficiency. 
 Given that (short of much additional analysis) we cannot appeal to economic 
efficiency in our classification and analysis of tax expenditures, our measurement of tax 
expenditures becomes partly (if not wholly) arbitrary, in the sense that it is governed by 
notions of “fairness” or  “neutrality”, and depends on what one is comparing with 
what. The EIA report (1992) makes a similar point: “tax expenditures exist when actual 
tax treatment for particular kinds of taxpayers deviates from standard tax treatment” 
(p. 21), although “there is disagreement as to what constitutes standard tax treatment...” 
[p. 21].) Consequently, in the following sections, we merely raise some considerations 
that might be relevant in estimating and comparing tax expenditures.   
 Because tax laws change, some of our discussion below may be out of date. For a 
review of tax and regulatory legislation currently affecting energy industries, see the 
Earthtrack (2004) website, which is discussed briefly in section 18.4.12.  
 
18.3.1 Accelerated Depreciation 
 
18.3.1.1  Definitions  
 When determining the level of income upon which they are liable for taxes, firms 
may deduct any expenses incurred in generating their income.  In the case of operating 
expenses, these are normally deducted in the year in which the expenses are incurred.  
For capital investment, this is not the case.  Because a fixed asset has can be used for 
many years, firms must depreciate it over its useful life rather than expensing it in the 
year it was purchased.  There is little debate that depreciating an asset is the 
appropriate means of expensing (deducting) a capital investment.  At issue is the 
appropriate rate at which the asset is depreciated.   
 Accelerated depreciation can be viewed as any depreciation rate that is faster 
than some baseline rate of depreciation.  Accelerated depreciation changes the timing 
but the not the total amount of deductions over an asset’s life: with accelerated 
depreciation, a firm deducts more in the early years than it would in the case of 
“normal” appreciation. This generally is desirable because it generally is desirable to 
have money now (in the form of reduced tax payments) rather than later.  
 The OMB estimates tax expenditures due to accelerated depreciation by 
comparing actual depreciation deductions with the deductions that would obtain with 
straight-line depreciation, in which the value of an assets declines linearly with time. If 
one believes that straight-line depreciation is the appropriate baseline, and more 
generally, that favoring capital investment is “unfair,” then it is appropriate to use the 
OMB and JCT estimates of accelerated depreciation tax expenditures.  
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18.3.1.2  Considerations 
  One can argue that the depreciation tax expenditures should be calculated not 
with respect to straight-line depreciation necessarily but rate with respect to the true 
economic rate of depreciation, which is not necessarily always linear over time.  Some 
kinds of assets wear out or devalue more quickly in the earlier stages of use. For these 
assets, the claimed “accelerated” depreciation might actually be the true economic rate 
of depreciation, in which case there is no tax expenditure with respect to the true 
depreciation rate. Generally, we expect that tax expenditures will be less with respect to 
true economic depreciation than with respect to straight-line depreciation.  
 Consideration of inflation also affects estimates of tax expenditures.  According 
to the Joint Committee on Taxation, “The measurement of income from capital under 
the normal income tax structure9 does not take into account the effects of inflation on 
such items as depreciation...As a result, some tax expenditure estimates will generally 
be larger than would be the case if the normal tax structure provided for inflation 
adjustments in these items” (Joint Committee on Taxation, 1991, p.6).  In other words, a 
depreciation baseline that accounts for inflation will look more like an accelerated 
depreciation, because the “inflated” part of remaining value will be removed.  
 More generally, one can ask under what conditions accelerated depreciation, 
however measured, should be counted as a tax expenditure.  Accelerated depreciation 
(however measured) is available to all firms, and provides favorable treatment of 
capital investments in general. It is not a tax break for energy over other industries, or 
oil over other energy industries: virtually all major energy sources require large 
investments in capital.  For this reason, the EIA (1992) excludes accelerated depreciation 
in their study of energy “subsidies”.  In their words: “Programs that provide incentives 
for broad classes of economic activity, such as investment in fixed capital or investment 
in basic research, have been excluded, because they affect neither the choice between 
energy and non-energy investment, nor the choice among particular forms of energy” 
(EIA, 1992, page 3). 
 However, accelerated depreciation does in some sense favor capital-intensive 
means of producing energy over less capital-intensive alternatives such as end-use 
efficiency. For this reason, Heede (1985) and Koplow (1993), who were comparing 
efficiency and “soft” energy sources (such as solar power) with traditional energy 
sources (such as coal, oil, and nuclear), both consider accelerated depreciation to be an 
energy “subsidy”.  
 More subtly, one can argue that the corporate income tax itself discourages 
capital investment, and that accelerated depreciation mitigates this disincentive.  The 
corporate tax rate raises the pre-tax rate of return an investment must generate to 
preserve the after-tax return (Pechman, 1987, page 147).  However, historically this 
negative effect of the corporate income tax has been “cushioned by substantial increases 
in capital-consumption allowances.  Whereas straight-line depreciation was the rule 
before World War II, the postwar tax law allowed more accelerated methods and 
sharply reduced the period over which depreciation was taken” (Pechman, 1987, page 
149).  One might argue, then, that if accelerated depreciation is to be counted as a tax 
expenditure, then the disincentive of the corporate income tax should be counted as a 
tax penalty (negative tax expenditure).    
 
                                                
9 The normal income tax structure assumes straight line depreciation. 
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18.3.1.3 Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) 
 The 1986 Tax Reform amended but did not repeal accelerated depreciation 
allowances.  In order to eliminate areas of contention between taxpayers and the IRS 
over the appropriate useful life and salvage value, the Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System contains eight classes of assets, each of which has a specific useful life 
and depreciation method.  Salvage value is ignored under MACRS.  “With these rules, 
possibilities for abuse using unrealistic values for useful life and salvage value are 
essentially eliminated (Pratt and Kulsrud, 1993, page 9-5).  Prior to the revision, capital 
costs were recovered over a period which was much shorter than the useful life of the 
asset.  According to Pechman, “depreciation allowances in the MACRS are closer to, but 
still somewhat more liberal than, economic depreciation for equipment” (Pechman, 
1987, page 162).  Because tax expenditure estimates use a baseline of straight-line 
depreciation, accelerated depreciation should still be considered an active provision, 
and not residual as asserted by Koplow (1993).  Both the JCT and the OMB project that 
the total tax expenditures resulting from this will continue to grow over the next few 
years.  
 Depreciation allowances under the MACRS became effective for property in 
place on or after January 1, 1986.   
 
18.3.2  Investment Tax Credits 
 The investment tax credit was effective from January 1, 1962 to December 31, 
1985, with the exception of two brief periods in the late 1960’s.  It was eliminated by the 
1986 Tax Reform Act. The credit allowed firms to deduct from their tax liability 10 
percent of the costs of any new investment that had a recovery period exceeding three 
years. This had an effect similar to a depreciation allowance greater than 100 percent of 
the cost of the asset (Pechman, 1987).  Recent estimates of tax expenditures for both 
OMB and JCT no longer include figures for investment tax credits.  Presumably, there 
are no longer any residual effects from this provision. 
 
18.3.3  Percentage Depletion (in excess of cost depletion) 
 An excellent description of percentage depletion can be found in the Federal 
budget: 
Independent fuel mineral producers and royalty owners are generally allowed to take 
percentage depletion deductions rather than cost depletion on limited quantities of 
output.  Under cost depletion, outlays are deducted over the productive life of the 
property based on the fraction of the resource extracted.  Under percentage depletion 
taxpayers deduct a percentage of gross income from mineral production at rate of ...15 
percent for oil...Unlike depreciation or cost depletion, percentage depletion deductions 
can exceed the cost of the investment. (OMB, 1992, page 2-29) 
 In 1975, percentage depletion was eliminated for major oil companies, and 
between 1976 to 1984 percentage depletion allowances for smaller independent oil 
producers were eventually reduced to the current rate of 15 percent of gross income 
from production.   
 Percentage depletion provides oil producers with incentives to increase the 
development of existing oil fields since the total depletion deduction which they claim 
may exceed their original investment (EIA, 1992).  This allowance favors any mineral 
fuel source over alternative energy sources which do not require mineral extraction, 
including energy efficiency. 
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18.3.4  Expensing of Exploration and Development Costs (Intangible Drilling Costs) 
 This provision allows oil companies to expense costs incurred in developing an 
oil field, rather than amortize these costs over the life of the property.  Major oil 
companies are  permitted to expense 70% of these cost of successful domestic wells in 
the current year, and amortize the remaining 30% over five years.  All of the costs of 
unsuccessful domestic wells may be expensed in the year they are incurred.  
Independent oil producers can expense 100% of the costs of successful and unsuccessful 
domestic wells.   
 Tax expenditures for intangible drilling costs can be negative, and that in fact is 
what both Koplow (1993) and EIA (1992) report. That is, in 1989, this tax provision 
actually provided “extra” tax revenues for the government—revenues that it would not 
have received had the policy not been in place. This is possible because, in any given 
year, the expensing provision will have two countervailing effects. On the one hand, 
current expenses taken in the given year will reduce taxable income and hence reduce 
tax payments, compared to what would be the case were there no expensing provision. 
By this effect (of current expensing), the government loses tax revenue on account of the 
expensing provision. On the other hand, had there been no expensing provision in 
years past, then firms would have had to spread their past expenses over several years, 
in some cases up to the given year. In that case, had there been no expensing provision, 
firms would have reduced their tax liability in the given year rather than in past years. 
By this effect (of past expensing), the government receives tax revenues in the current 
year on account of the expensing provision.  
 The net effect of having and having had an expensing provision is the sum of 
these two countervailing effects. (The same reasoning applies if one does a future rather 
than a historical analysis of the expensing provision.) If current expenses exceed 
foregone past expenses in the current year, then the tax expenditure will be positive; 
otherwise, it will be negative.  In a normal growth period, the tax expenditure is 
positive, but the EIA (1992) explains that the sharp decline in oil prices has resulted in 
decreased exploration and development expenditures, and hence relatively low current 
expenses.    
 The EIA (1992, page 106) explains the impact of this policy:  
This tax deferral provision has historically been one of  the most important for oil and gas 
producers.  The rapid write-offs have added to other incentives to engage in exploration 
and development.  As a result, domestic crude oil production has been greater than it 
would otherwise have been and capital has been diverted from more productive 
activities.  The increased output has contributed to oil prices being lower than they 
otherwise would be, despite OPEC’s price controlling position, and to constrained 
growth for non-conventional forms of energy. 
 More recent estimates suggest that this provision may now result in a positive 
tax expenditure.  In 1989, the total tax expenditure outlay equivalent for both oil and 
gas was a negative $65 million.  The 1993 estimate is a positive $185 million. However, 
the oil share of this is uncertain.  OMB forecasts between 1993 and 1999 show a 
declining trend in the tax expenditures, but the estimates remain positive.10   
                                                
10Apparently, some in the oil industry believe that the fiscal impact of these expensing provisions should 
not be counted as a tax expenditure, presumably on the ground that the provisions are part of a broadly 
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18.3.5  Expensing of Tertiary Injectants 
 This provision allows oil companies to expense the costs of certain chemical 
injectants used to enhance the process of recovering oil (EIA, 1992, page 108).  The 
effects of this policy have been insignificant.  Estimates of the tax expenditures 
associated with this do not exceed $20 million.  Their primary effect is to increase the 
life of certain oil wells beyond the economically efficient life. 
 
18.3.6  Exception from Passive Loss Limitations 
 Passive losses (or income) are those losses (or income) which result from 
activities in which the tax payer did not materially participate.  Prior to the 1986 Tax 
Reform, tax payers could use losses from one activity to offset the income generated by 
another.  This created a strong incentive to invest in tax shelters which would incur 
accounting losses in order to reduce the overall tax liability of the firm.  Usually these 
losses were artificial, in the sense that often they were the result of mismatching 
expenses and revenues in the early years of an investment.  The 1986 Tax Reform did 
not completely eliminate this provision, but it did place strong restrictions on the ways 
in which the passive losses could be used to offset income from other activities.  
However, owners of working interests in oil and gas properties are exempt from these 
limitations.   
 The passive loss limitations, and the oil and gas exemption, primarily apply to 
partnerships and individuals, not corporations.  Hence, this provision creates an 
incentive for unlimited-liability partnerships to develop oil-and-gas properties. Also, 
the exemption does provide some incentives to increase exploration and development 
of oil properties because the subsidy attracts new capital.  However, because of the 
large risks associated with an unlimited liability partnership, the effects of this 
provision are likely to be small (Pratt and Kulsrud, 1993; EIA, 1992). 
 
18.3.7  Alternative Fuel Production Credit 
 This credit applies to qualified fuels that are from wells drilled or facilities in 
place between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1992 and are sold before the end of 
2002.  There are a number of alternative fuels which are eligible for this credit, including 
oil produced from shale or tar sands.11   Qualifying firms receive a tax credit of $3 (in 
1979 dollars) for each barrel of oil-equivalent fuel produced, provided the price per 
barrel of oil remains below $23.50 (in 1979 dollars).  The credit is gradually phased out 
as the price of oil increases from $23.50 to $29.50 (in 1979 dollars). 
 The credit is in effect a price subsidy. It is meant to encourage production of 
alternative fuels by minimizing the economic risks associated with low market prices 
for oil.  Koplow (1993) estimates that the oil industry received between $2.5 and $5.0 
million dollars in alternative fuel production credits in 1989—an evidently minor 
                                                                                                                                                       
equitable tax policy, and are not exceptional or preferential.  Although in the end this is a matter of 
judgment, we note that to our eye, the expensing provisions look exceptional.  
 
11 The fuels which qualify for this credit are: (1) oil produced from shale and tar sands; (2) gas from 
pressurized brine, Devonian shale, coal seams, tight formations or biomass; (3) liquid, gaseous, or solid 
synthetic fuels produced from coal; (4) fuel from qualified processed wood; and (5) steam from 
agricultural by-products.  The most fuel most affected by this credit is probably gas produced from coal 
seeams (EIA, 1992). 
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amount.  However, between 1989 and 1994, the total tax expenditure (not necessarily the 
oil share) associated with this provision increased almost a hundred-fold.  The OMB 
estimate of the total outlay equivalent rose from $10 million in 1989 to $900 million in 
1994.  The OMB and JCT only report the data, and provide little analysis of trends.  
Hence, the cause of this increase is unclear, although a significant share of it can 
probably be attributed to the changes that resulted from the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 
which provides additional support for the development of alternative fuels.  It is 
unlikely that the oil industry share of the benefits from the alternative fuel production 
credit has increased dramatically.     
 
18.3.8  Research and Development Tax Credit 
 “The tax credit is 20 percent of the qualified expenditures in excess of each year’s 
base amount” (OMB, 1990, page A63).  This credit expired in July 1995 (OMB, 1995). 
 
18.3.9  Expensing of Long-term Research and Development 
 “Research and experimentation (R&E) projects can be viewed as investments 
because their benefits accrue for several years when they are successful.  It is difficult, 
however, to identify whether a specific R&E is completed and successful and, if it is 
successful, what its expected life will be.  For these reasons, the statutory provision that 
these expenditures may be expensed is considered part of the reference law.  Under the 
normal tax method, however, the expensing of R&E is viewed as a tax expenditure.  The 
baseline assumed for the normal tax method is that all R&E expenditures are successful 
and have an expected life of five years” (OMB, 1992, page 2-29). 
 
18.3.10  Deferral of Tax on Shipping Companies 
 “Certain companies that operate U.S. flag vessels receive a deferral of income 
taxes on that portion of their income used for shipping purposes, primarily 
construction, modernization and major repairs to ships, and repayment of loans to 
finance these qualified investments” (OMB, 1990, page A67).    
 Although this provision is intended to maintain the U.S. merchant marine, a 
share of the benefits accrues to the oil industry since some oil travels via U.S. flag 
vessels. 
 
18.3.11  Special Treatment of Alaskan National Corporations 
 “Tax law restricts the ability of profitable corporations to reduce their tax 
liabilities by merging or buying corporations with accumulated net operating losses 
(NOLs) and as yet unrefunded claims to investment credits.  Alaska Native 
Corporations have a limited exemption (fifteen years after the NOL or credit was first 
experienced) from these restrictions that includes NOLs and credits claimable prior to 
April 26, 1988” (OMB, 1990, page A67). 
 
18.3.12  Safe Harbor Leasing 
 “Under this provision, a corporation, otherwise unable to utilize the accelerated 
depreciation allowances and investment credit, might sell to, and then lease from, 
another corporation assets acquired after December 31, 1981.  The term of such 
leaseback agreements, absent the safe harbor leasing provision, would not qualify the 
lessor corporation as the owner of the assets and allow it to utilize the investment 
incentives for tax purposes.  The selling corporation could gain at least part of the 
financial advantage provided by the investment tax incentives by successfully 
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negotiating leaseback agreements below market costs.  Although this provision was 
repealed in 1982, its budget effects persist for the duration of the safe harbor lease 
entered into in 1981” (OMB, 1990, page A66).    
 The 1991 federal budget contains estimates of the tax expenditures associated 
with this provision.  By 1995, estimates were no longer provided.  Presumably, the 
residual effects from this item no longer persist. 
 
 
18.4  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this section we review a number of the “tax-subsidy” studies done over the 
last 15 years, and one study of state and local “subsidies”.  Most of these studies have 
tried to quantify preferential Federal tax treatment of energy industries in general. We, 
however, will review only the parts of these studies relevant to the oil industry.  
 Over the past 15 years tax provisions have changed considerably—most 
dramatically on account of the 1986 Tax Reform. Consequently, we will focus mainly on 
the better of the more recent studies (EIA, 1992; Koplow, 1993), and relatively little on 
the pre-1986 studies (Cone et al., 1980; Heede et al.1985). Readers interested in a more 
comprehensive review of these and other studies should  see Koplow and Dernbach 
(2001)12.  
 We limit this review to studies of tax expenditures specifically, or of “subsidies” 
more broadly. We do not review studies of the total social cost of oil use or motor-
vehicle use, even if they include estimates of tax expenditures, because virtually all such 
social-cost studies are literature reviews themselves.    
 For a comprehensive listing of federal intervention in oil markets, see Earthtrack 
(2004).  
 
18.4.1  Cone et al. (1980) 
 This study was prepared by Battelle Memorial Institute for the U.S. Department 
of Energy primarily as a response to the 1973 oil crisis and consequent desire to make 
the U.S. more self-sufficient in energy production.  The purpose of the analysis was to 
assist in the “study and recommendation of Federal incentives for the development of 
solar energy” (Cone et al., 1980, p. 1).  The authors recognized that in order to develop a 
coherent strategy for the development of solar energy, they needed to identify the 
distortions in the energy market which resulted from Federal incentives to stimulate 
energy production.  The study covered nuclear energy, hydroelectricity, coal, oil natural 
gas and electricity. 
 
18.4.1.1  Definition of an incentive 
 Unlike most of the other studies, this report did not attempt to quantify 
“subsidies” to the oil industry.  Rather, it focused on “incentives.”  The intent was to 
                                                
12 Koplow and Dernbach (2001) review studies of federal subsidies to fossil-fuel use, and then discuss the 
implications of reforming these subsidies on policies designed to abate emissions of greenhouse gases. 
Thus, their purpose is not to estimate “subsidies” as true social costs. They identify three kinds of 
measures of subsidies: i) the value of specific government programs to particular industries; ii) the 
difference between the domestic (subsidized) price of energy and the foreign (unsubsidized) price of 
energy; and iii) the producer or consumer subsidy equivalent, which is meant to capture direct 
government-industry transfers and the effects of pricing distortions.  
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determine how Federal policy influenced the mix  of energy sources. In Cone et al. 
(1980),  any action which the government can take to expand residential and 
commercial use of an energy source is an incentive.  
 
18.4.1.2 Data and estimates 
 The study identifies two major areas of oil energy incentives: (1) exploration and 
production, and (2) refining and product transportation.  The key contribution of this 
study was to recognize that past as well as present policies, decisions, and events can 
distort present energy markets. Because these historical events and decisions can play 
an important role in the current state of the industry, simply eliminating presently-
distortionary policies might not sufficiently “correct” energy markets to enable 
emerging alternatives (such as solar power, in the Cone et al. Study) to compete fairly. 
Cone, et al. estimate that between 1916 and 1978, Federal oil incentives totaled $123.6 
billion (in 1978 dollars). The results of their analysis are shown in Table 18-1.  
 
18.4.2  Heede et al. (1985) 
 
18.4.2.1  Definition of “Subsidy”  
 According to Heede et al. (1985), a “subsidy” is “any Federal expenditure that 
makes energy appear cheaper to final consumers than its full economic cost.” 
 
18.4.2.2  Data and estimates 
 This study identifies the Federal interventions in the energy market during fiscal 
year 1984 that target the following energy sources: crude oil, natural gas, coal, synfuels, 
electricity (four sources of generation), non-hydroelectric renewables, and efficiency.  
Subsidies were classified into three categories: 
 Tax expenditures were special provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that 
resulted in revenue losses to the Treasury.  These provisions allowed exemptions or 
deductions from gross income or provided a special credit, a preferential tax rate, or a 
deferral of tax liability (page 6).  Heede, et al estimate that fiscal year 1984 Federal tax 
expenditures that benefited the oil industry amounted to $7.3 billion. 
 Agency program  outlays were usually made to ameliorate certain market 
failures (page 6).  Examples of this included expensive or risky research and 
development projects undertaken by the Federal government on the behalf of the 
private sector and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.  Heede et al. (1985) estimate that 
$1.3 billion in agency outlays benefited the oil industry in 1984. 
 Loans and loan guarantees were the costs to the Treasury of providing interest-
free subsidies and paying for occasional defaults (page 6).  Heede et al. did not estimate 
these costs to the oil industry. 
 Heede et al. (1985) identify their data sources clearly but do not detail their 
estimates. This probably does not matter now, because the study was done before the 
1986 Tax Reform  and so is of limited relevance today. However, the study 
wascomprehensive at the time, and did provide a useful framework for subsequent 
studies (particularly Koplow’s).  
 The results of his study are shown in Table 18-2.  
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18.4.3  Kosmo (1987) 
 Kosmo (1987) defines a subsidy as the difference between the domestic and 
world prices, and on this basis does a comparison of different countries.  This effort is 
outside of our scope, and is not considered further reviewed here. 
 
18.4.4  U.S. Energy Information Administration (1992) 
 This report was prepared by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the 
U. S. Department of Energy, in response to a mandate by Congress to prepare a report 
which covered both direct and indirect Federal energy subsidies, methods of valuing 
those subsidies, and a survey of the subsidies currently in place. 
 
18.4.4.1  Definition of “Subsidy”  
 “EIA incorporated a broad definition of subsidization including most 
governmental actions which had as their function alteration of energy markets 
benefiting some group of producers or consumers”  (EIA, 1992, p. ix). 
 
18.4.4.2  Data and estimates 
 Unlike Heede (1985) and Koplow (1993), the EIA limits its analysis to programs 
whose primary purpose is to directly influence energy markets.  Thus, because 
accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits benefit capital investment in 
general, the EIA does not include these.  It is worth noting that these two items 
represent a significant percentage of the subsidy estimates in these other studies.  In the 
Heede et al. (1985) report, accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits account 
for 78 percent of the total tax expenditures, and 66 percent of the total subsidy to oil.  In 
Koplow’s (1993) study, these provisions represent between 62 and 79 percent of the 
total tax expenditures, and between 22 and 43 percent of the total subsidy to oil.13  Also, 
the EIA omits the costs of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve on the assumption that is 
meant to provide national security and public transport.  
 EIA defines two kinds of subsidies:  
 
Direct subsidies are direct payments to producers or consumers, and tax 
expenditures (as defined in the Federal tax code), provided conditional on the 
recipient engaging in energy production or consumption. 
 
Indirect subsidies consist of government actions (other than direct subsidies) 
which involve some form of Federal financial commitment that affects the cost of 
consumption or production of some form of energy. They include the provision 
of energy at below-market rates, loans or loan guarantees, government 
assumption of risk, research and development, and provision of regulatory 
services. 
 
 The EIA’s (1992) estimates are summarized in Table 18-3. Note that the EIA 
(1992) counts as a negative subsidy any excise taxes—mainly the portion of the Federal 
excise tax on gasoline that is earmarked for deficit reduction—that go into the general 
                                                
13 It appears that the principle cause of the difference in the share of the total oil subsidy that these two 
provisions represent is due to Heede’s lower estimate of total government outlays.  We are not sure 
because Heede et al. (1985) do not provide details on their estimates. 
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fund. This $3.1 billion negative subsidy swamps the other subsidies (which total $947 
million) and results in an overall  negative subsidy to the oil industry.   
 Is it reasonable to count the deficit-reduction portion of the gasoline tax as a 
negative subsidy (tax expenditure)? Only the EIA (1992) does. The California Energy 
Commission (1993), in its analysis of the social cost of motor-vehicle use, believes that 
the EIA should not have included the negative subsidy, because according to the CEC 
(1993) funds from excise taxes are earmarked for a specific purpose and are usually a 
mechanism for paying for government goods and services—that is, they are like a user 
fee, not a general tax. Thus, since revenue collected from these taxes does not contribute 
to the general fund, the CEC (1993) contends that it should not be included in the 
analysis. However, the CEC (1993) apparently is mistaken, because the EIA (1992) has 
counted only those excise taxes (mainly the deficit-reduction tax on gasoline) that do 
indeed go into the general fund.   
 We agree with the EIA that any excise tax revenues that contribute to the general 
fund and are not used for a specific purpose may be counted as negative tax 
expenditures.  However, excise taxes collected specifically for the purposes of offsetting 
external or government costs of fuel production or consumption (e.g., the Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund) should not be included in an analysis of general government tax 
expenditures, government tax subsidies, or government tax fairness.     
 There is, however, one important caveat to our concurrence that it is acceptable 
to count general excise taxes as a negative tax expenditure. If one classifies the deficit-
reduction tax on gasoline as a general tax, like an income tax, rather than as a road-user 
fee (like most of the rest of the excise tax on gasoline), then, in an analysis of the social-
cost of motor-vehicle use, one cannot also count the general excise-tax revenues as user-
fee payments for the highways, to be credited against government outlays for 
highways.  The deficit-reduction portion of the excise tax may be credited against 
government expenditures on the highways, or against government expenditures for 
general purposes, but not both. (In Report #17, we count it as a payment for highways, 
rather than as a contribution to the general fund.)  
 The results of their analysis is shown in Table 18-314.  
 
                                                
14Although this report is concerned mainly with tax expendiures, and not with government outlays, we 
think it useful to remind the reader that the EIA has not included in its estimates several kinds of 
government outlays -- such as for the SPR -- that other studies have included. The EIA (1992) excluded 
the SPR on the grounds that it is meant to provide national security and benefits the oil industry only 
indirectly. We do not agree with their reasoning for excluding the cost of the SPR as a government outlay . 
Although it may be true that the SPR was developed in the interests of national security, the correct 
question to ask -- in an analysis of the social cost or public-sector-cost of oil use -- is whether or not a 
reduction in oil consumption would reduce the cost of the SPR. If it would, then the SPR is by definition a 
cost of oil use. Although we do not know the precise relationship between oil consumption and the cost 
of the SPR, especially at the margin (in large part because the behavior of government decision makers is 
hard to predict), we do believe that the SPR is at least a long-run cost of all oil use. Thus, the cost of the 
SPR is appropriately included in an analysis of the social cost of oil use.  
 There are of course many complications. For example, it might be that the SPR is constrained 
politically to an economically suboptimal size. If so, then the size of the SPR might not be reduced if oil 
consumption is reduced. But then, in this case, one also must account for the “residual” energy security 
costs -- those not mitigated by the SPR -- because they will decline with declining oil consumption if the 
size of the SPR does not. 
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18.4.5  Koplow (1993) 
 
18.4.5.1  Definition of “Subsidy”  
 In this report, subsidies are: “(1) government-provided goods and services, 
including risk-bearing, which otherwise would have to be purchased in the 
marketplace; and (2) reductions in tax burdens compared to standard treatment for  a 
similar activity” (p. i).   
 
18.4.5.2  Data, methods, and estimates 
 Koplow (1993) focuses on Federal interventions in the energy market targeted at 
coal, oil, gas, solar (non-grid), ethanol, biomass (non-grid), energy efficiency, and 
electricity (including eleven sources of generation).  The study is modeled after that of 
Heede et al., (1985), but is a more comprehensive analysis and a significant 
improvement.  It is based on the 1989 tax laws and accounts the effects of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act. 
 
 “Subsidies” are classified into three categories:  
 
Tax Benefits are defined as any tax provision that reduces the effective rate of 
taxation.  This includes tax credits, reductions in the tax rate, reductions in the 
tax basis, and alterations in the taxable entity.  Koplow (1993) estimates that the 
total tax-benefit subsidy to the oil industry ranged between $1.8 and $4.6 billion 
in 1989. 
 
Federal Agency Programs include a wide range of government activities that 
benefit energy sources directly or indirectly.  These include government R&D 
expenditures, low-interest loans, and losses on government enterprises.    
 
Other Market Interventions include government assumption of risk, changes in 
the rules by which people may buy or sell energy services, and Federal 
procurement of energy services.  Koplow does not quantify these other market 
interventions in the oil market.  
 
 All subsidy estimates are calculated using a zero government spending and 
policy baseline, and include all stages of energy use such as research, exploration, 
extraction, refinement, distribution, consumption and waste disposal.  This baseline 
assumes that there is no government budget, no tax benefits and no energy policy.  
Deviations from this baseline are considered a subsidy.   
 Koplow (1993) provides both a low and a high estimate of the subsidies.  In 
general, the low estimate reflects the government costs of providing the particular 
benefit, and the high estimate represents the market value of the subsidy to the 
industry.  Koplow asserts that the latter is the preferred measure of the market 
distortions and barriers to entry for emerging energy sources. Overall, Koplow’s (1993) 
analysis is one of the most comprehensive.  
  According to Koplow, “it cost taxpayers at least $20 billion in 1989 to subsidize 
the energy sector.  This $20 billion includes two components - $7.7 billion in tax 
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expenditures and $12 billion in Federal budget outlays” (Koplow, 1993, p. 24).15  
Koplow’s (1993) estimate of $7.7 billion in energy-related tax expenditures (a portion of 
which is allocated to the oil industry) is derived from OMB and JCT figures, which, as 
discussed above, do not sum to a meaningful total. Koplow acknowledges this problem 
when he admits that it is difficult to determine how much of the $20 billion total really 
would have been saved, because “eliminating one subsidy might allow businesses and 
consumers to re-direct their energy choices toward another subsidy” (Koplow, 1993, p. 
24).  However, he appears to leave this concern aside, for he goes on to conclude that “if 
the total level of all subsidies for individual supply-side resources, for instance, were 
reduced to the level of subsidies for end-use efficiency ($570 million), taxpayers would 
have saved about $19 billion of the $20.4 billion spent in 1989.”  For our part, we think 
that the difficulties with summing the OMB and JCT estimates should not be dismissed 
so lightly.    
 Koplow’s estimates are summarized in Table 18-4. 
 
18.4.6  Management Information Services, Inc. (MIS) (1993) 
 The purpose of this report was to quantify the magnitude of federal government 
support for the energy industry over the last fifty years. However, the authors do not 
provide a clear definition of “support”, and provide little details on their methods.   
   MIS estimates that the total subsidy to the oil industry through 1992 totaled $239 
billion (in 1992 dollars).  Federal energy-related activities are classified into one of six 
categories (with total oil industry benefits through 1992 in parenthesis): research and 
development ($5 billion)16, regulation ($85 billion)17, taxation ($121 billion)18, 
disbursements ($4 billion)19, government services ($21 billion)20 and market activity ($3 
billion)21.  They do not explain how these estimates were derived.   
 Because of the incomplete details and a lack of analysis in the report it is difficult 
to comment further on their results.   
 
                                                
15 Note that these figures respresent his estimates to the energy industry  as a whole, not the oil industry 
exclusively.  
 
16 Includes federal research and development expenditures for the oil industry and the pro-rated costs of 
US Geological Survey and Bureau of Mines data collection costs. 
 
17 Includes exemption from price controls for stripper wells and the costs of oil industry regulation. 
 
18 These tax expenditures resulted primarily from percentage depletion allowances and intangible 
drilling costs. 
 
19 Consists primarily of subsidies for construction and operation of oil tankers. 
 
20 Consists primarily from the pro-rated costs of maintaining ports and inland waterways. 
 
21 This refers to the oil-related activities of the Bureau of Land Management. 
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18.4.7  Loper (1994) 
 This study, which is a companion to Koplow (1993), is the only detailed study of 
state and local tax policies available.22  In 1991, state and local governments collected a 
total of $525 billion in revenues (roughly 80 percent of what the Federal government 
collected) including $40 billion from energy taxes.  Loper estimates that nationwide, 
state and local taxes on end-use energy products are 30 percent lower than the average 
sales tax. This preferential treatment resulted in $7.4 billion in foregone tax revenue, 
$4.1 billion of which could be attributed to petroleum products.   
 
18.4.7.1 Objective 
 Loper (1994) focuses on state and local tax policies that impact the 10 most 
widely used end-use energy products and services: petroleum, electricity and natural 
gas for residential, industrial and office use, and gasoline for highway use.  The primary 
goal of the study is to estimate foregone state and local tax revenues, which he calls “net 
energy tax subsidies,” on account of preferential tax treatment for energy. He estimates 
the net energy tax subsidy (foregone revenue) on the basis of the difference between an 
“energy tax rate” and the general sales tax rate for each state. The energy tax rate is 
discussed below. 
 
18.4.7.2 Data, methods, and estimates 
 The study identifies four ways in which tax biases for energy-related activities 
may occur: (1) different statutory tax rates, (2) partial or total tax exclusions, (3) tax 
refunds or credits, and (4) additional special taxes.  Loper analyzed all areas of the tax 
codes, including general sales taxes, gross receipts taxes, highway fuel taxes, income 
taxes, and property taxes, along with numerous lesser-known taxes imposed on or 
containing some special treatment of energy or energy businesses.  From this he 
compiled a database of over 1,000 energy-related state and local tax code provisions 
that were in place as of July 1993.  The study includes only those taxes and tax 
provisions that are likely to be borne by end-use consumers.   
 Loper (1994) notes that there are some important tax issues which are not 
addressed in his report.  For example, the report includes only state and local tax 
provisions that specifically affect energy consumers or producers.  Hence, accelerated 
depreciation and investment tax credits are not included.  Passive tax provisions (tax 
breaks passed through from the Federal income tax code) are not included.  The study 
also omits non-tax interventions, such as government regulations and spending.   
 Loper calculates the “energy tax rate,” as a percentage of the pre-tax retail price 
of energy, in four steps.  First, he identifies taxes imposed on energy products.  The two 
main energy tax categories which are related to petroleum use identified in the study 
are petroleum taxes (including user fees, which he deducts in the next step), and 
severance and production taxes. 
 Second, Loper deducts any user fees included in the first step.  He deducts these 
because user fees are intended to “fund government-provided services that primarily 
benefit the payer of the taxes, or they are intended to compensate governments for costs 
incurred as a result of the taxable activity.”  These include highway fuel taxes, toll 
                                                
22 For the purposes of this study, the District of Columbia is considered a state. 
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collections and vehicle registration fees, environmental fees and assurances,23 and 
petroleum inspection fees. 
 Third, Loper makes adjustments for related income and property tax provisions.  
Although some states have exemptions from income and property taxes for petroleum 
related activities, these are not included in the analysis because the author believes that 
these benefits will not be passed on to end-use consumers.  Thus, there are no 
adjustments made for the oil industry. 
 Finally, Loper adds in the applicable general sales taxes.  Only eight states 
subject gasoline to sales taxes, although most have some sales tax provision for 
petroleum used in homes, offices and industries. 
 In sum, Loper calculates the energy tax rate, as a percentage of the pre-tax retail 
sales price, as all applicable energy taxes except user fees plus applicable sales taxes. 
Loper (1994) then compares this energy tax rate with the prevailing general sales tax 
rate, and calculates the taxes that would have been collected had energy been taxed at 
the general sales tax rate rather than the estimated energy-tax rate, assuming that sales 
prices and quantities were unchanged.  The estimated foregone revenues are the net energy 
tax subsidy.    
 Based on the difference between the energy tax rate and the general sales tax 
rate, Loper finds that 38 states under-taxed petroleum for highway use, 24 states under-
taxed petroleum for residential use, 31 states under-taxed petroleum for industrial use, 
and 5 states under-taxed petroleum for office use.  The net energy tax subsidy attributed 
to petroleum, i.e. the revenue impact on state and local governments, totaled $4.1 billion 
in 1991. 
 Loper’s  (1994) estimates are summarized in Table 18-5. The appendix to Loper’s 
report provides a detailed listing of the energy-related tax provisions for each state. 
 
18.4.8  Domestic Fuels Alliance (1995) 
 This report by the Domestic Fuels Alliance (DFA) is a response to oil-industry 
lobbying efforts to eliminate any Federal incentives that promote alternative-fuel use. 
Unfortunately, the estimates in this report are merely pieced together—often 
uncritically and inconsistently—from other studies of tax subsidies.  
  DFA’s summary table, presented on page 5 of its report, is difficult to interpret. 
It presents the table as a “total Federal energy subsidy costs to government on an 
annual basis,” drawn from eight different studies conducted over the last 20 years.  One 
of these eight is the 1992 study by the World Resources Institute (Mackenzie et al., 
1992), which estimated that costs of motor-vehicle use “not borne by drivers” in the 
United States amounted to some $300 billion.  However, the $300 billion of Mackenzie 
et al. (1992) included all kinds of environmental externalities and other costs “not borne 
by drivers” (such as free parking); tax expenditures and government-agency outlays 
constituted but a small fraction of the $300 billion. In light of this, we do not know 
exactly what DFA is purporting to measure.  
 Similarly, we do not understand DFA’s presentation, in their section titled 
“Federal Petroleum Subsidies,” of the analysis done by the EIA (1992).  The DFA states, 
correctly, that the EIA (1992) estimated that Federal energy “subsidies” were about $5 to 
$10 billion. This, however, was the subsidy to all energy sources. As we noted above, 
the EIA (1992) estimated that the “subsidy” to petroleum specifically—and the DFA is 
                                                
23 A number of these taxes fund environmental actions required as a result of oil spills. 
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presenting the estimate in a section called “Federal Petroleum Subsidies”—was a 
negative  $2.2 billion.   
 Because the DFA study is derivative and difficult to interpret, we do not 
summarize the results here. The American Petroleum Institute (1995) offers a critique of 
the DFA study.  
 
18.4.9  Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) (Hwang, 1995) 
The UCS estimates hidden “subsidies” to the oil industry. It defines “subsidy” to 
include:  
 
i) reduced corporate income taxes for the oil industry;  
ii) lower than average sales taxes on gasoline;  
iii) government funding of programs that primarily benefit the oil industry and 
motorists, and  
iv) “hidden” environmental costs such as air, water, and noise pollution.  
 
 As discussed above, we are not concerned here with expenditures for 
government goods and services (subsidy iii in the USC’s accounting), or environmental 
externalities (subsidy iv in the USC’s accounting). The UCS’s estimates of reduced 
corporate income taxes, and lower-than-average sales taxes, are relevant, but either are 
based on the work of Koplow (19930 or Loper (1994) or else are similar to the analysis 
presented here. Therefore, we do not analyze the UCS work further.  
 
18.4.10 Energy Information Administration (1999, 2000) 
In 1999 and 2000, the EIA updated it’s 1992 study on Federal Energy Subsidies. 
The 1999 report examines Federal programs that provide a specific financial benefit to 
producers of primary energy, and the 2000 report examines programs targeted at the 
energy transformation and end-use sectors. The 1999 and 2000 reports use a narrower 
definition of “subsidy” than did the 1992 report and include a couple of tax 
expenditures not in the 1992 report, but otherwise the methods and data sources in the 
reports are similar. Table 18-3 shows the EIA’s 1999 and 2000 estimates alongside the 
1992 estimates.  
 
18.4.11 Green Scissors (2004) 
The annual Green Scissors (2004a) report identifies tax expenditures, direct 
government expenditures, R&D programs, loan programs, and other government fiscal 
programs and policies that the authors believe are environmentally harmful and 
generally wasteful. The 2003 report includes a discussion of oil royalty exemptions and 
specific road and highway projects. 
A different Green Scissors (2004b) focuses more specifically on “tax breaks” 
(similar to our “tax expenditures”) and “spending subsidies” (similar to our “direct 
government spending”) for energy industries. They estimate that existing tax breaks for 
the oil  industry cost $2.6 billion per year, an estimate that turns out to be similar to our 
independent estimate derived in section 18.5. The Green Scissors (2004b) estimates are 
summarized in Table 18-6.  
 
18.4.12 Earthtrack (2004) 
The Earthtrack website keeps tabs on tax expenditures, direct government  
spending, government loans, and government research and development outlays that 
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affect energy industries. In the case of oil, Earthtrack (2004) lists all of the expenditure 
categories in section 18.3  of this report, plus a couple  of others: tax  relief for certain oil 
producers from the Alternative Minimum Tax, and exclusion of interest on IDBs for 
seaports and marine terminals.  Earthtrack also tabulates direct spending by 
government agencies that benefits the oil industry. For the most part the web site does 
not present estimates of the magnitude of the tax expenditures. 
 
 
18.5  ESTIMATES OF CORPORATE-INCOME TAX AND SALES-TAX 
EXPENDITURES, BASED ON AVERAGE TAX RATES 
  
18.5.1  Corporate income-tax expenditures for the oil industry 
 All previous estimates of tax expenditures identify individual “preferential” tax 
provisions, estimate the revenue losses owing to each provision, and then sum the 
losses to produce the total tax expenditure. In our view, this method has two 
shortcomings. First, it is piecemeal, and liable to inconsistency and incompleteness. It 
requires that the researcher decide upon a standard tax treatment and then examine 
every tax provision consistently with respect to that standard. Second, the estimates are 
derived from OMB and JCT figures, which as discussed do not sum to a meaningful 
total expenditure estimate. 
 An alternative approach is to estimate and compare overall actual tax rates—
taxes actually paid as a fraction of some measure of income or value. This method has 
several advantages: it uses aggregated data on overall taxes, rather than estimates of 
individual provisions, and therefore will include the effect of all provisions, favorable 
or unfavorable (so that one is not liable to the charge of having omitted the 
countervailing effect of any unfavorable tax provisions); it uses data on actual tax 
payments and income, rather than OMB and JCT estimates; and it uses an intuitively 
appealing and straightforward basis of comparison: actual tax rates. Of course, there is 
at least one disadvantage to using aggregated data: they do not reveal potentially 
important details.  
 To develop our average-tax estimates we use industry-level corporate Federal tax 
and income data published by the Internal Revenue Service (1994, 2003).  In Table 18-7 
(which presents data for “income-year” 1991) we divide Federal income taxes and 
Federal income taxes after credits by net income and taxable income, for various 
industry groupings. Part A of the table shows the actual income and tax payments, and 
Part B shows the calculated tax rates based on the data in Part A. The tables show the 
taxes for each major industry group, and then for oil and motor-vehicle-related 
industries within the major group. Totals are presented for all industries, oil-related 
industries, motor-vehicle related industries, other industries, and the motor-fuel and 
motor-vehicle-related industries.  
 The results of the 1991 analysis are illuminating. The income tax liability of the 
oil industries, before tax credits are taken, and expressed as a fraction of net income (not 
taxable income), is actually relatively high—higher than the average for other 
industries.  However, as one would expect, the tax liability expressed as a fraction of 
taxable income is similar in all industries. From this we infer two things: i) that on 
average most industries are in the same tax brackets, and ii) that the oil industry did not 
exempt as much of its net income as did other industries. For every $100 of taxable 
income, most industries, including the oil industries, had a tax liability of about $35. 
However, the oil industry had about $120 of net income for every $100 of taxable 
 25 
income, whereas other industries had about $160 of net income for every $100 of taxable 
income.   
 However, the standings change when we consider income tax after credits—that 
is, income tax actually paid, which undoubtedly is the more equitable basis of 
comparison. The last two columns of Table 18-7 reveal that the oil industry paid a 
relatively small amount of income tax as a fraction of its net income—considerably less 
than did other industries, on average. Comparison of columns 1 and 3 indicates that in 
the oil industry, tax credits were more than half of the pre-credit tax liability, whereas in 
other industries they were less than one quarter. Line-by-line (i.e., industry-group by 
industry-group) comparisons of the results in column 3 of the third part of the table (oil 
industries) with the results in column 3 of the second part (industries excluding oil) 
show that the oil industry pays on the order of half as much tax per dollar of net income 
as do other industries24.  
 What would the oil and vehicle industries had paid if they had paid income tax 
after credits at the national average rate for all industries other than the oil and vehicle 
industries? Table 18-8 answers this question. It shows how tax payments would have 
changed if the tax rate were at the average for other industries rather than the actual in 
1991, for each of the four tax-rate metrics. We see that if the oil industry had paid 
income tax after credits at the national average rate (for other industries) with respect to 
net or taxable income, it would have paid $2.1 to $3.9 billion more in taxes after credit 
than it actually did. (The change in the motor-vehicle industry is very small.) This is 
similar to Koplow’s (1993) estimate of $4.5 billion in income-tax subsidies to the oil 
industry in 1989 (Table 18-4), and Green Scissor’s (2004b) estimate of $2.6 billion/year 
as of 2002 (Table 18-6). If the calculation is done on the basis of the national average 
rates for all industries including the oil and vehicle industries, the oil industry would 
have paid $2.0 to $3.6 billion more in taxes after credit. (The “subsidy” amount is less 
because the average rate including the oil and vehicle industries is less than the average 
rate including them.)  
 When the analysis is done for motor-vehicle industries plus the highway-fuel 
share of oil industries, the results are similar to those for motor-vehicle + oil industries, 
except that the estimated tax expenditures are smaller because only a fraction of the oil 
industry (which receives the largest subsidies) is counted as being motor-fuel related. 
Corporate income-tax expenditures associated with the motor-vehicle and motor-fuel 
industries amounted to $1.4 to $2.8 billion in 1991, with essentially all of this deriving 
from motor- fuels (the oil industry) rather than from the motor-vehicle industry.  
 Table 18-9 shows the same calculations done with “income-year” 2000 corporate 
income-tax data. The tax rates, shown in Part A of the table, are similar to those 
estimated for 1991 (Table 18-7) with one exception: the difference between the ratio of 
income tax after credits to net income for the oil industry and the ratio for all industries 
(or all other industries) is less than what it was in 1991. As a result, the total “subsidy” 
calculated on this basis (Part B of Table 18-9) is the same as it was in 1991 (about $2 
billion) even though net income increased substantially from 1991 to 2000 while overall 
tax rates remained about the same. 
 For income-year 2000, the tax expenditures for motor-vehicle industries plus the 
highway-fuel share of oil industries are $0.9 to $7.4 billion when the baseline is the 
                                                
24 The data are not available to conduct a formal statistical test of whether thes ratios actually are 
statistically significant from each other. 
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average tax rate in all other industries (Table 7), and $0.8 to $6.5 billion when the 
baseline is the average rate in all industries including oil and vehicle-related industries.  
  
18.5.2  Sales-tax expenditures related to the use of motor vehicles and motor fuel 
Most states and some cities and counties assess a sales tax on most retail 
transactions. Different rates apply to different products and to retail-sector vs. 
wholesale-sector vs. service-sector transactions, and as a result one may estimate tax 
expenditures (positive or negative) on sales of particular goods and services relative to 
any number of “fair” baselines.  
To estimate the sales-tax expenditures related to motor-vehicle use, one must 
decide the rate at which sales of motor vehicles, parts, and fuels should have been taxed, 
and compare that to the rate at which they actually were taxed. Table 18-10 presents 
comprehensive data on sales of and sales taxes on motor vehicles and parts, motor-fuel, 
and automotive services, at the retail and wholesale levels, and national data on sales 
and sales taxes in the entire retail, wholesale, and service sectors. With these data, we 
can make a number of comparisons of sales taxes actually paid on vehicles, parts, and 
fuel with the amount that would have been paid at different “fairer” baseline tax rates. 
The last part of Table 18-10, from lines 26L to 30H, shows tax expenditures calculated 
with respect to different baseline tax rates, beginning with the highest rate (which 
results in the highest expenditures or “subsidies” to motor vehicles and fuels) and 
ending with the lowest rate, which actually results in a negative tax expenditure 
(because the actual tax rate on motor vehicles and fuels is higher than the lowest 
baseline rate).  
If the baseline rate is assumed to be state and local posted sales-and use-tax rates, 
then tax expenditures on items related to motor-vehicle use are quite high, about $15 
billion in 1990 and almost $40 billion in 2004 (lines 26L and 26H). This however does 
not seem a reasonable basis, because average actual tax rates clearly are well below the 
posted rates. Indeed, if one goes to the other extreme and assumes that the appropriate 
baseline tax rate is total national sales and use taxes divided  by total final sales to 
consumers (which excludes wholesale sales), and compares this with actual average 
sales tax rate on motor-vehicle related goods and services in the retail and service 
sectors, one finds the latter exceeds the former, with the result that motor-vehicle 
related items currently are overpaying sales and use taxes by at least $10 billion (lines 
30L  and 30H). An intermediate case, in which one calculates the baseline tax rate for 
sales in the service, wholesale, and retail sectors that actually are subject to sales taxes 
(i.e., excluding in this case all “exempt” sales from the baseline, whereas in cases 30L 
and 30H exempt sales are included in the baseline), results in tax expenditures on 
motor-vehicle and fuel-related sales on the order of $2 billion per year in 1990 and up to 
$15 billion at present (lines 28L and 28H). If one considers just the retail sector, then the 
actual average rate on motor-vehicles and fuels of about 2.6% is less than the national 
average rate of around 4%, and tax expenditures are on the order of $6 billion in 1990 
and about $15 billion at present (Lines 27L and 27H). 
Finally, we can compare our estimates with Loper’s (1994). As we mentioned in 
section 18.4.7, Loper (1994) estimates that in 1991 state and local sales-tax expenditures 
on all petroleum products totaled $4.1 billion, of which approximately $2.5 billion 
pertained to highway fuels specifically (based on the ratios of Table 18-5). Our own 
estimate is that $122 billion in sales of fuels and lubricants was taxed at 1.8%, versus a 
national average of 3.6% for all retail sales (Table 18-10), resulting in a sales-tax 
expenditure of $2.1 billion. This is close to Loper’s (1994) estimate.   
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18.5.3  Summary 
 We estimate that sales-tax and corporate-income-tax expenditures related to 
motor vehicles and motor fuels, estimated as the difference between what tax payments 
would have been at a “fair” baseline rate and what tax payments actually have been, 
may be on the order of several billion dollars per year. However, we emphasize again 
that these estimates must be considered with respect to questions of fairness, not 
economic efficiency.  The question of how the income of different industries (or 
individuals) should be taxed is primarily an equity issue, to be evaluated by normative 
criteria. We do not undertake a normative analysis here.  
 We do, however, apply our estimates of tax expenditures in our analysis of user 
payments for government-provided motor-vehicle infrastructure and services, in 
Report #17. In that report, we point out that if certain kinds of general taxes are counted 
as payments by motor-vehicle users for government-provided motor-vehicle 
infrastructure and services, then it is reasonable to count general tax expenditures 
related to motor-vehicle use as subsidies to motor-vehicle users. Therefore, in Report 
#17, we deduct tax expenditures from estimated user payments. The deducted tax 
expenditures of more than $20 billion are about 7% of estimated user payments, a small 
but not trivial fraction of total payments.   
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TABLE 18-1.  CONE ET AL. (1980) SUMMARY OF OIL INCENTIVES BY TYPE  FROM 1916 - 
1978 (MILLIONS OF 1978 DOLLARS) 
 
Incentive area Estimate 
Research and development 1,287  
   
Exploration and production  
 U.S. Geological Survey - data 574  
 Bureau of Land Management - leasing 498  
 Bureau of Mines - data 18  
 Stripper well price incentives 16,840  
 Incentives for new oil 33,340  
 Economic Regulatory Administration a 1,708  
 Intangible drilling expense 15,449  
 Percentage depletion allowance 40,033  
   
Refining and transportation  
 High yield on pipelines 5,601  
 Maintenance of ports and waterways 6,923  
 Subsidies for tankers 1,301  
   
Total  123,572  
 
Source: Cone et al. (1980), page 240. 
 
a Includes the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
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TABLE  18-2.  HEEDE ET AL. (1985) FY1984 FEDERAL SUBSIDIES TO OIL  (MILLIONS OF 
1984 DOLLARS) 
 
Federal tax expenditures  
 Intangible drilling costs 890  
 Percentage depletion allowance 740  
 Accelerated cost recovery 3,780  
 Investment tax credits 1,890  
   
 Total tax expenditures 7,300  
Federal agency outlaysa 1,270  
Total Federal oil subsidies 8,570  
 
Source: Heede et al. (1985), page 12. 
 
a Includes expenditures from the following agencies: Department of Energy, Army Corps of 
Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency, Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves, 
Internal Revenue Service, Minerals Management Service, Coast Guard, Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve, Bureau of Land Management, United States Geological Survey, and Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission.  Detailed estimates for each agency were not provided in the report. 
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TABLE 18-3.  EIA ESTIMATES OF FY1992 AND FY 1999 OIL SUBSIDY ELEMENTS IN 
FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON A BUDGET OUTLAY BASIS (MILLIONS OF 1992 OR 1999 
DOLLARS) 
 
 
Type of subsidy 1992 (106 1992 $) 1999 (106 1999 $) 
Income tax expendituresa 395  263 
LIHEAPb 262  n.e. 
Cost of regulatorsc /direct expenditures 215  255 
Excise tax contributions without 
offsetting liabilitiesd 
(3,132) n.e. 
Research and development 75  49 
Total Federal subsidies (2,185) 567 
 
Sources: 1992 data from EIA (1992) p. 7; 1999 data from EIA (2000) p. 54.  
 
a Most of the EIA (1992) estimates of tax expenditures are taken from the Federal budget and 
from the Joint Committee on Taxation.   
 
b The Low Income Housing Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) disburses money to the 
States for the purpose of providing assistance to approximately 5.8 million low-income 
households for payment of utility bills and weatherization of residences.  In FY1992, LIHEAP 
totaled $1.1 billion in outlays. EIA (1992) estimates that approximately $262 million of this can 
be attributed to petroleum products (pages 7, 11-12). See Appendix A for details. 
 
c “Cost of regulators” in the 1992 report, “direct expenditures” in the 1999/2000 reports. The 
cost of regulators includes the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the 
Department of the Interior minerals management programs.   
 
d See the discussion in the text.  
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TABLE 18-4.  KOPLOW (1993) ESTIMATES OF FY1989 FEDERAL SUBSIDIES TO OIL 
(MILLIONS OF 1989 DOLLARS) 
 
Tax benefit subsidy allocations Statusa Low High 
Tax credits    
  Alternative fuel production credit active 2.5  5.0  
  ITCs: new machinery and equipment residual 242.4  616.8  
  R&D tax credit active 28.3  72.0  
Other reductions in the effective tax rate    
 Activities or products exempt from taxation    
  Tax exempt bond issues: pollution control residual 148.8  181.5  
  Tax exempt bond issues: seaports, etc. narrowed 52.6  53.5  
Reductions in the effective taxable basis    
 Expensing of costs normally capitalized    
  Expensing of long-term R&D active 50.9  79.2  
  Expensing of oil & gas exploration and 
development  
narrowed (44.3) (204.5) 
  Expensing of tertiary injectants active 20.0  20.0  
 Accelerated depreciation of certain assets    
  ACRS/accelerated depreciation of machinery 
and equipment 
residual 873.8  2,996.6  
 Deferral of required income tax payments    
  Deferral of tax on shipping companies active 6.3  60.0  
 Special deductions    
  Percentage of depletion benefits narrowed 245.1  333.1  
Special definitions of the taxable entity    
 Benefits due to special congressional exemptions    
  Passive loss restrictions active 92.0  204.5  
  Special treatment of Alaskan national 
corporations 
residual 102.4  186.9  
  Foreign research expense,  offset of domestic 
income 
active 0.0  0.1  
 Benefits due to transfer pricing    
  Sale harbor leasing  (24.9) (51.2) 
Total tax benefit subsidy allocations  1,795.9  4,553.5  
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Agency spending, loans & loan guarantees Status Low High 
Executive Branch    
  International Development Assistance: 
multilateral development banks 
active 14.3  14.3  
Department of Defense    
  Army Corps of Engineers civil program active 417.7  417.7  
  Navy Supervisor of Salvage active 0.0  18.5  
Department of Energy    
  Energy R&D, waste management and 
administration 
active 120.8  120.8  
  Strategic Petroleum Reserves active 1,736.7  2,061.9  
  Energy Information Administration active 31.0  31.0  
  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission active (0.4) (0.4) 
  Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves active 0.0  103.9  
Department of Health and Human Services    
  Family Support Administration: LIHEAP active 347.7  347.7  
Department of the Interior    
  Minerals Management Service active 93.1  93.1  
Department of Transportation    
  Coast Guard active 406.2  406.2  
  Maritime Administration active 111.3  111.3  
  Federal Railroad Administration active 0.8  1.5  
Independent Agencies    
  Export-Import Bank active 85.1  98.7  
  Total government support  3,364.3  3,826.2  
      
      
Total Federal subsidies to oil in FY 1989  Low High 
  Tax benefits plus government support  5,160.2  8,379.7  
 
Source: Koplow (1993), Appendix A-8, A-9. 
 
a Active refers to those policies that were still in effect in 1989. 
 Residual refers to those policies which were repealed or expired before 1989, but which still 
affected tax expenditures in 1989 on account of transitional rules, or stored credits.  
 Narrowed refers to those provisions which were still in effect in 1989, but for which eligibility 
had been tightened. 
 37 
TABLE 18-5.  LOPER (1994) ESTIMATES OF 1991 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF 
PETROLEUM (MILLIONS OF 1991 DOLLARS) 
  
 Petroleum 
Category Highway Home Industry. Office Totals 
1. Energy tax revenues 22,003  51  251  236  22,541  
2. User fee revenues (included 
in above) 
21,368  36  110  26  21,540  
3. General sales tax revenues 2,168b  232  861  339  3,600  
4. Net energy tax subsidiesa (2,677) (467) (733) (190) (4,067) 
 
Source: Loper (1994), page 46. 
 
a Negative numbers represent under-taxation. For two reasons, the net energy tax subsidies 
shown here cannot be calculated from the data shown in this table, or for that matter, from the 
data shown in Loper (1994). First, the net energy tax subsidy is the difference between net 
energy tax revenues and revenues that would have been generated had energy been taxed at 
the general sales-tax rate, and neither this table nor Loper’s report show the latter. Second, the 
net energy tax revenues are not exactly equal to line 1 minus 2 plus line 3 (as one might expect 
on the basis of Loper’s method), because “of the different expenditure bases used to calculate 
revenues for each tax category.  In particular, energy tax revenues  [and] user fee revenues..  are based 
on energy expenditures that exclude both energy and general sales taxes, [whereas] general sales tax 
revenue” are based on energy expenditures excluding sales taxes, but including energy taxes.. (Loper, 
1994, p. 46).  
 
b In Report #17 of this social-cost series, we use data from the U.S. Census to estimate that in 
1991, sales taxes on highway fuels and lubricants generated $2.18 billion in sales-tax revenues. 
This is virtually identical to Loper’s estimate of  $2.17 billion.  
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TABLE 18-6.  GREEN SCISSORS (2004B) ESTIMATES OF EXISTING TAX-BREAK SUBSIDIES 
TO THE OIL INDUSTRY IN 2002 
  
Type of tax break Cost/yr (106 $) 
Enhanced  oil recovery 280  
Intangible drilling costs 920 
Non-conventional fuel production credit 900 
Passive  loss 20 
Percentage depletion allowance for fossil fuels 440 
Total  tax breaks 2,560 
 
Source: Green Scissors (2004b). 
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TABLE 18-7.  OUR ESTIMATES OF U.S. FEDERAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES, 
INCOME-YEAR 1991 
 
PART A: CORPORATE INCOME TAXES OF ACTIVE CORPORATIONS (103 1991 DOLLARS) 
 
Industry Group Net income Taxable 
Income 
Income Tax 
Before 
credits 
Income Tax 
After 
Credits 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 3,774,209  1,875,241  520,185  473,493  
     
Mining 7,721,788  4,495,495  1,814,367  1,041,082  
Oil and gas extraction 5,818,875  3,187,606  1,302,585  645,160  
All other mining 1,902,913  1,307,889  511,782  395,922  
     
Construction 14,965,305  6,662,049  2,008,680  1,722,422  
Heavy construction 3,575,418 2,343,458 800,148 602,173 
     
Manufacturing 181,884,248  152,624,397  53,891,094  32,104,071  
Petroleum refining 23,747,357  22,605,091  7,927,594  2,826,449  
Motor vehicles and equipment 1,123,915  692,399  277,809  201,320  
All other manufacturing 157,012,976  129,326,907  45,685,691  29,076,302  
     
Transportation and Public 
Utilities 
53,590,652  47,111,134  17,143,124  15,793,417  
     
Wholesale Trade 29,096,847  16,267,870  5,340,458  4,649,750  
Petroleum and petroleum 
products 
3,270,404  1,832,262  627,077  211,213  
Motor vehicles and auto. equip. 1,913,058  1,397,644  498,907  493,011  
All other wholesale trade 23,913,385  13,037,964  4,214,474  3,945,526  
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Retail Trade 35,151,817  23,994,992  7,862,574  7,343,538  
Gasoline service stations 451,697  201,452  53,083  51,198  
Motor vehicle dealers 1,704,165  555,345  159,309  152,368  
All other retail trade 32,995,955  23,238,195  7,650,182  7,139,972  
     
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate, Other 
174,249,613  80,797,221  27,281,531  24,850,137  
Services n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. 
Auto repair and maintenance 1,246,131 584,960 180,171 154,139 
     
Totals     
All industries  535,816,622 350,009,712 121,121,231 92,566,319 
Oil industriesa 33,288,333 27,826,411 9,910,339 3,734,020 
Motor-vehicle industriesb 5,987,269 3,230,348 1,116,196 1,000,838 
Oil and vehicle industries 39,275,602 31,056,759 11,026,535 4,734,858 
All other industries  496,541,020 318,952,953 110,094,696 87,831,461 
Motor-vehicle and motor-fuel 
relatedc 31,076,325 24,746,152 8,665,043 4,064,016 
 
Source: Internal Revenue Service (1994). The taxes in this table include only the Federal 
corporate income tax.  They do not include any other federal taxes (e.g. excise taxes and other 
non-income taxes) or any state and local taxes. The data are for “income year” 1991, which 
refers to corporate accounting periods ending between July 1 1991 and June 30 1992. 
 
a Comprises oil and gas extraction, petroleum refining, petroleum and petroleum products, and 
gasoline service stations.  
 
b Comprises motor vehicles and equipment (under manufacturing), motor vehicles and auto 
equipment (under wholesale trade), motor vehicle dealers, and automobile repair and 
maintenance. 
 
c  Equal to the amount for each motor-vehicle or oil industry multiplied by the fraction of the 
amount in the industry that actually pertains to motor-vehicles or motor fuels, summed for all 
motor-vehicle or oil industries. For example, petroleum refineries produce products other 
than highway fuels, which in this accounting we wish to exclude. We count 100% of motor-
vehicle industries as being motor-vehicle related (actually, 99%of motor-vehicle dealers,  
because these sell a few off-highway vehicles), and the following fractions of oil industries as 
being motor-fuel related: 30% of oil and gas extraction, 78% of petroleum refining, 57% of 
petroleum and petroleum products (wholesale), and 93% of gasoline service stations. We also 
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count 38% of heavy construction (the portion we estimate is for streets and roads). The 
fractions are the same as those used in the analysis of user payments in Report #17, and 
ultimately are from Report #10 in the social-cost series.  
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PART B: CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES, INCOME-YEAR 1991 
 
Industry Group Tax  ÷ Net 
Income 
Tax ÷  
Taxable 
Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Net Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Taxable 
Income 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 13.8% 27.7% 12.5% 25.2% 
     
Mining 23.5% 40.4% 13.5% 23.2% 
Oil and gas extraction 22.4% 40.9% 11.1% 20.2% 
All other mining 26.9% 39.1% 20.8% 30.3% 
     
Construction 13.4% 30.2% 11.5% 25.9% 
Heavy construction 22.4% 34.1% 16.8% 25.7% 
     
Manufacturing 29.6% 35.3% 17.7% 21.0% 
Petroleum refining 33.4% 35.1% 11.9% 12.5% 
Motor vehicles and equipment 24.7% 40.1% 17.9% 29.1% 
All other manufacturing 29.1% 35.3% 18.5% 22.5% 
     
Transportation and Public 
Utilities 32.0% 36.4% 29.5% 33.5% 
     
Wholesale Trade 18.4% 32.8% 16.0% 28.6% 
Petroleum and petroleum 
products 19.2% 34.2% 6.5% 11.5% 
Motor vehicles and auto. 
equip. 26.1% 35.7% 25.8% 35.3% 
All other wholesale trade 17.6% 32.3% 16.5% 30.3% 
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Retail Trade 22.4% 32.8% 20.9% 30.6% 
Gasoline service stations 11.8% 26.4% 11.3% 25.4% 
Motor vehicle dealers 9.3% 28.7% 8.9% 27.4% 
All other retail trade 23.2% 32.9% 21.6% 30.7% 
     
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate, and Other 15.7% 33.8% 14.3% 30.8% 
Services n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. 
Auto repair and maintenance 14.5% 30.8% 12.4% 26.4% 
     
Overall averages     
All industries  22.6% 34.6% 17.3% 26.4% 
Oil industries 29.8% 35.6% 11.2% 13.4% 
Motor-vehicle industries 19.7% 35.4% 17.9% 32.0% 
Oil and vehicle industries 28.5% 35.6% 12.0% 15.0% 
All other industries  22.2% 34.5% 17.7% 27.5% 
Vehicle & motor-fuel related 27.9% 35.0% 13.1% 16.4% 
 
Source: Calculated from the data in Part A of the table. 
 
 44 
TABLE 18-8.  OUR ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT ON INCOME-TAX PAYMENTS OF PAYING AT 
THE U. S. AVERAGE RATE (FOR ALL OTHER INDUSTRIES) RATHER THAN THE ACTUAL 
RATE, INCOME YEAR 1991 (103 DOLLARS) 
 
 Income tax rate basisa 
Industry Group Tax ÷ Net 
Income 
Tax ÷ 
Taxable 
Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Net Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Taxable 
Income 
 ∆ tax            ∆ tax                 ∆ tax after 
credits   
∆ tax after 
credits 
Oil industries (2,529,541) (305,348) 2,154,241 3,928,660 
Motor-vehicle industries 211,321 (1,160) 58,230 (111,283) 
Oil and vehicle industries (2,318,220) (306,507) 2,212,470 3,817,377 
All other industries 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle and motor-fuel related (1,774,698) (123,281) 1,432,971 2,750,440 
 
A negative number means a decrease in tax payments; i.e., that taxing at the average rate for  all 
other industries would decrease income-tax payments by the amount shown.  
 
a The rate basis used to calculate the effect of changing from the actual rate to the average rate 
for all other industries. These correspond to the rates calculated in Table 18-7.  
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TABLE 18-9.  CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, RATES, AND “SUBSIDIES,” INCOME-YEAR 2000 
 
PART A. TAX  RATES, INCOME-YEAR 2000. 
 
Industry Group Tax  ÷ Net 
Income 
Tax ÷  
Taxable 
Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Net Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Taxable 
Income 
All industries  19.9% 35.0% 15.3% 26.8% 
Oil industries 31.1% 35.4% 12.7% 14.4% 
Motor-vehicle industries 22.8% 36.1% 16.8% 26.6% 
Oil and vehicle industries 28.6% 35.6% 13.9% 17.3% 
All other industries 19.1% 34.9% 15.4% 28.1% 
Vehicle and motor-fuel related 28.6% 35.6% 14.4% 17.9% 
 
Source: Calculated from income and tax data for corporations whose accounting periods ended 
between July 1 2000 and June 30 2001 (IRS,  2003).  
 
 
PART B. THE EFFECT ON INCOME-TAX PAYMENTS OF PAYING AT THE U. S. AVERAGE 
RATE (FOR ALL OTHER INDUSTRIES) RATHER THAN THE ACTUAL RATE, INCOME-YEAR 
2000 (103 DOLLARS). 
 
 Income tax rate basisa 
Industry Group Tax ÷ Net 
Income 
Tax ÷ 
Taxable 
Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Net Income 
Tax After 
Credits ÷ 
Taxable 
Income 
 ∆ tax            ∆ tax                 ∆ tax after 
credits   
∆ tax after 
credits 
Oil industries (9,348,671) (302,016) 2,099,162 9,376,047 
Motor-vehicle industries (1,233,426) (244,529) (465,005) 330,436 
Oil and vehicle industries (10,582,096) (546,545) 1,634,157 9,706,483 
All other industries 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle and motor-fuel related (8,540,633) (470,286) 927,156 7,418,725 
 
A negative number means a decrease in tax payments; i.e., that taxing at the average rate for  all 
other industries would decrease income-tax payments by the amount shown.  
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a The rate basis used to calculate the effect of changing from the actual rate to the average rate 
for all other industries. These correspond to the rates calculated in Part A of this table.  
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TABLE 18-10. SALES-TAX EXPENDITURES RELATED TO THE USE OF MOTOR VEHICLES 
 
 1990 1991 1994 2000 2004 
Sales or receipts from (106 $):a      
1. Retail of motor vehicles 297,496 285,604 407,310 557,858 670,048 
2. Retail of auto parts and supplies 64,271 61,745 68,810 72,931 68,813 
3. Retail of fuels and lubricants 122,827 121,755 126,293 176,903 213,051 
4. Total retail sales (Line1+Line2+Line3) 484,594 469,105 602,413 807,692 951,913 
5. Wholesale of motor vehicles and parts 
(SIC 501) 365,583 379,576 454,085 698,780 935,176 
6. Automotive service sector (SIC 75) 73,722 71,542 91,287 139,831 185,406 
7. Total motor-vehicle related sales or receipts  
(Line4+Line5+Line6) 923,900 920,223 1,147,784 1,646,302 2,072,494 
Sales tax as a fraction of: a      
8. Retail sales of motor vehicles 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.024 
9. Retail sales of auto parts and supplies 0.039 0.040 0.044 0.051 0.056 
10. Retail sales of fuels and lubricants 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.022 
11. All retail sales motor vehicles, parts, and 
fuels (Line15*1000÷Line4) 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 
12. Wholesale of motor vehicles and parts 
(SIC 501) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
13. Automotive service receipts (SIC 75) 0.032 0.033 0.036 0.042 0.046 
14. All motor-vehicle related sales or receipts 
(Line18*1000÷Line7) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
General sales taxes from (109 $):       
15. Retail sales of vehicles, parts, & fuel 
(Line1*Line8+Line2*Line9+Line3*Line10
)÷1000 11.97 12.04 15.34 21.03 24.88 
16. Wholesale of motor vehicles and parts 
(SIC 501) (Line5*Line12÷1000) 1.83 1.90 2.27 3.49 4.68 
17. Automotive service sector (SIC 75) 
(Line6*Line13÷1000) 2.38 2.37 3.26 5.81 8.51 
18. All motor-vehicle related sales or 
receipts (Line15+Line16+Line17) 16.19 16.31 20.88 30.33 38.06 
19. Total with low adjustment (Line18*LA)b 16.19 16.31 20.88 30.33 38.06 
20. Total with high adjustment (Line18*HA)b 19.42 19.57 25.05 36.40 45.68 
 
Table continued on next page. 
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TABLE 18-10. SALES-TAX EXPENDITURES, CONTINUED 
 
 1990 1991 1994 2000 2004 
Baseline national sales-tax rates      
21. Posted state and local average ratec 0.058 0.059 0.061 0.064 0.067 
22. Sales tax fraction in retail sectord 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 
23. Sales-tax fraction in retail sector, wholesale 
sector, and service-sector SICs subject to sales 
taxe 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.023 0.025 
24. Sales-tax fraction in retail, wholesale, and 
service sectorsf 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 
25. Sales-tax receipts as a fraction of final 
national salesg 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.020 
Tax expenditures based on (109 $):       
26L. Posted state and local average rates, low  
taxes (Line4*Line21÷1000-Line15*LA) 16.32 15.62 21.25 31.06 39.01 
26H. Posted state and local average rates, high 
taxes (Line4*Line21÷1000-Line15*HA) 13.92 13.21 18.19 26.85 34.03 
27L. Sales-tax fraction in the retail sector 
(Line4*Line22÷1000-Line15)*LA 5.47 4.70 7.03 10.66 13.80 
27H. Sales-tax fraction in the retail sector 
(Line4*Line22÷1000-Line15)*HA 6.57 5.64 8.43 12.79 16.56 
28L. Sales-tax fraction in the retail sector, 
wholesale sector, and service-sector SICs 
subject to sales tax (Line7*Line23÷1000-
Line18)*LA 2.08 1.64 2.84 7.24 12.93 
28H. Sales-tax fraction in the retail sector, 
wholesale sector, and service-sector SICs 
subject to sales tax (Line7*Line23÷1000-
Line18)*HA 2.49 1.97 3.40 8.69 15.52 
29L. Sales-tax fraction in the retail, wholesale, 
and service sectors (Line7*Line24÷1000-
Line18)*LA -0.90 -1.30 -1.29 -0.53 0.72 
29H. Sales-tax fraction in the retail, wholesale, 
and service sectors (Line7*Line24÷1000-
Line18)*HA -1.08 -1.56 -1.55 -0.63 0.87 
30L. Sales-tax receipts as a fraction of final 
national sales of all goods and services , 
low taxes ([Line4+Line6]*Line25 ÷1000-
[Line15+Line17]*LA)h -2.62 -3.30 -4.49 -6.43 -10.40 
30H. Sales-tax receipts as a fraction of final 
national sales of all goods and services , 
high taxes ([Line4+Line6]*Line25 ÷1000-
[Line15+Line17]*HA)h -5.50 -6.18 -8.21 -11.79 -17.08 
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SIC = Standard Industrial Classification, a scheme for classifying business establishments by the 
type of activity they are engaged in (Office of Management  and Budget,1987); LA = low 
adjustment factor (1.0); HA = high adjustment factor (1.2), where the adjustment factor 
accounts for the possibility of under-reporting of taxes to U. S. Census (see Report #17). An 
“L” or an “H” after a row number (e.g., “28H”) signifies the “low-adjustment” or the “high-
adjustment” case. 
  Note that lines 1-20 of this table are identical to Table 17-15 in Report #17. Therefore, see 
the discussion of Table 17-15, in Report #17, for explanation of the methods and data pertinent 
to lines 1-20 of this table. The remaining lines in this table (21-30) are documented here. 
 
a See Table 17-15 in Report #17.  
 
b As discussed in Report #17, it is possible that respondents to the Census’ surveys underreport 
sales taxes, but we assume not by more than 20%.  
 
c Loper (1994) states that the income-weighted national average state + local sales tax rate was 
about 6% in 1993. We assume that this has changed about 1%/year.  
 
d Sales-tax fractions in SICs 52-59 (the Retail Trade Division of the SIC) are from the sources 
used to estimate the values for lines 8 to 10 (see discussion of Table 17-15 in Report #17). .  
 
e Equal to 
! 
SF
SIC
"TS
SIC
SIC
#
TS
SIC
SIC
#
, where SFSIC is the sales-tax fraction in classification SIC and TSSIC is 
total sales in classification SIC. The relevant SICs are 50 and 51 (the Wholesale Trade Division 
of the SIC), 52-59 (the Retail Trade Division), and 70 (except 704), 72, 75, 76, and 79 (the 
service-sector SICs for which sales taxes are reported). The data for the parameters SFSIC and 
TSSIC are from the same sources used to estimate the values for lines 1 to 3, 5, 6, 8 to 10, 12, and 
13 (see discussion of Table 17-15 in Report #17). 
 
f  Same as line 23 (see table note e) except that for the term 
! 
TS
SIC
SIC
" in the denominator the 
relevant service-sector SICs are all those from 70 to 89 not exempt from the Federal income 
tax.  
 
g  Equal to actual sales and general-use taxes received by state and local governments divided 
by final national sales to domestic purchasers in the U. S. Sales-tax receipts through 1995 are 
from the Bureau of the Census, National Totals of State, and Local Tax Revenue, January 1988-
March 1996, (1997); sales-tax receipts from 1996 to 2004 are from the Bureau of the Census 
state and local government finances (www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html), which is 
essentially the same as the source used for the data through 1995. (Note that the Census 
government finance statistics are reported for fiscal years [FY]. To convert the Census fiscal-
year data to calendar-year [CY] estimates, I assumed that CYY = 0.6FYY +0.4FYY+1, where Y is 
the year. This required that we estimate FY2005 values.) 
  Final sales to domestic purchasers are equal to gross domestic product plus net imports 
of goods and services less the change in business inventories. The data on final sales are from 
Table 1.4.5,  “Relation of Gross Domestic Product, Gross Domestic Purchases, and Final Sales 
to Domestic Purchasers,” of the NIPA accounts (www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/index.asp). 
 
h Because this estimate of the tax expenditure is based on sales-tax receipts as a fraction of final 
national sales, we do not include sales and taxes in the wholesale sector.  
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FIGURE 18-1. THE IMPACT OF A PRICE SUBSIDY ON WELFARE 
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APPENDIX 18-A: THE LOW-INCOME HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(LIHEAP) (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,  FAMILY 
SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION) 
 
 The Low-Income Home Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is carried out through 
grants administered to States and Indian tribal organizations to aid low-income 
households with high-energy costs.  The program was developed primarily to maintain 
the standard of living, and in some cases the survival, of people living in low income 
households.  Approximately 5.8 million low-income households receive assistance from 
LIHEAP to help pay their utility bills and weatherize their homes.  Roughly 63 percent 
of LIHEAP funds are used for winter heating, approximately 18 percent of which is 
from petroleum-based sources.  Of the remaining 37 percent of LIHEAP funds, 1.5 
percent is used for cooling, 12 percent for year-round aid, 9 percent for administration, 
8 percent for weatherization, and 3 percent for use in non-energy programs (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1991, as cited in EIA, 1992). 
 The overall impacts of this program on energy consumption are difficult to 
quantify.  The average LIHEAP household consumed about 2.3 percent more energy 
(including all fuels) that did the average U.S. household, and 10 percent more than did 
the average low-income household.25  However, as the EIA notes, this higher average 
may not be entirely due to the subsidy.  It is possible that, on average, LIHEAP 
recipients tend to live in regions of the country with more severe winters that the U.S. 
population in general, and they may live in homes with poor insulation and inefficient 
appliances.   
 The effect of LIHEAP on oil consumption is even more unclear.  On average, 
LIHEAP recipients consume three percent less energy derived from oil than the national 
average, and four percent more than the average low-income household.  When 
sampling error is taken into account, it is likely that the annual energy consumption 
from oil from all three categories are about equal.  When the other factors mentioned 
above are considered (region of country and poor insulation), it is unclear what effect 
LIHEAP has had on oil consumption. 
 The LIHEAP program does not discriminate among energy sources—it even is 
used to promote end-use efficiency through weatherization.  The primary criteria for 
qualifying for assistance is need, not fuel used.  LIHEAP only favors the oil industry 
over alternative fuels to the extent that the alternative fuels are not a common source of 
energy for home heating.  However, it does not appear to create any barriers which 
would prevent alternative fuels from entering this market.   
 
                                                
25 There figures include all fuels and are based on household BTU consumption. 
 
